

into the relief legislation: first the provision relating to peace, order and good government, to which I shall refer in a few moments, and secondly the blank cheque feature. At that time I well recall, Mr. Chairman, that the hon. member for Quebec East, the former Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) took exception on high ground to this parliament abdicating its control over expenditure.

May I say that of all the relief bills of 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934, this bill of 1934 gives to the administration more extensive powers than any of the previous four. In order to keep the record straight may I once again place upon the pages of Hansard a quotation from a high constitutional authority on the power of parliament and its proper control over expenditures. This authority was quoted frequently by the Prime Minister when he was leader of the opposition. I quote from page 159 of *The Procedure of the House of Commons* by Redlich, as follows:

But there is something more to say. The fundamental principle just referred to secures only one of the great functions of parliament with regard to money matters. Soon after the great change made at the end of the seventeenth century, political experience showed that a second principle must be established before the foundations of parliamentary government could be regarded as secure. It was necessary to gain for the commons full and unrestricted control over the destination of the money spent, to enable parliament to check its application and to see that expenditure corresponded to the grants made. The working out of this principle led by degrees to the present financial apparatus of the House of Commons. The form of a bill of supply and the division or parliamentary business between the two money committees of the whole house had long been in existence. But from 1688 onwards the development of law and practice in finance procedure took a new turn: The old framework was retained, but a new spirit was breathed into all the forms of financial management, especially those relating to the expenditure of the state, and the administration of the moneys placed at the disposal of the government. The complete realization of the idea of parliamentary control reacted upon the whole organization of financial administration, just as the vast extension of the latter determined the way in which the great past of modern parliamentary government—direct parliamentary control over the whole of the national finances—reached its present shape. The result of the whole process has been to establish in actual fact the vital principle of modern parliamentary government—that of the full sovereignty of the nation's representatives in disposing of the financial burdens borne by their constituents.

Mr. MACDOUGALL: Is there anything in the constitutional practice evolved during the years in the parliament of Great Britain or of any of the British nations which lays it down

[Mr. I. Mackenzie.]

that the majority of the elected representatives of a free people are not capable of delegating to the executive the power over taxation and expenditure?

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver): I appreciate fully the suggestion contained in the interruption of the hon. member for Inverness (Mr. Macdougall), but may I say to him that in the whole history of the development of British and Canadian parliamentary institutions, the essential feature of the growing power of democracy has been the greater power exercised through control by the peoples' members over finance and expenditures. In order to illustrate my point further—

Mr. McINTOSH: The people must rule.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver): They used to. I desire to quote from another great authority. Colonel A. J. V. Durell in his book entitled *The Principles and Practice of the System of Control over Parliamentary Grants* states on page 2:

The bedrock on which the English system is built—

The English system is the British and Canadian systems.

—is the principle of the maintenance by parliament of control over the grants which it makes.

The following is to be found on page 3—

Mr. MACDOUGALL: But not by the minority of parliament.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver): By all the members of parliament provided they are properly carrying out the functions which they are here to carry out and not abrogating to any executive council, without any restraint or control, full and unrestrained powers over the expenditures of the country.

Mr. McINTOSH: Not partyism.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver): The author states on page 3:

The most ancient, as well as the most valued, prerogative of the House of Commons is the right of supreme control over taxation, to which the right to control issues is a natural corollary. The prohibition of raising taxes without parliamentary authority would be nugatory if the proceeds, even of legal taxes, could be expended at the will of the sovereign. The right, therefore, of appropriation was a logical consequence of the right of levying supplies. "The chain of historical evidence undeniably proves that a previous and stringent appropriation, often minute and specific, has formed an essential part of the British constitution." Though the practice of appropriat-