

very premise from which they start would forbid such an assumption, because we have heard the assertions of these hon. gentlemen as to the disorder having prevailed on this side. So, I do not see how the action of the Speaker can be regarded as directed more against one side than the other. I do not wish to discuss the incident further, but I merely desire to emphasize the point that the action that the Speaker took is not to be regarded as directed against one side or against the other; it is not to be regarded as directed against any person; it is to be regarded as action taken in the interest of the House itself for the purpose of bringing back the House and the committee to the order which had been lost for the moment. That, it seems to me, is the ground upon which the action of the Speaker was based on the occasion referred to.

The right hon. gentleman has discussed this question in a very fair way; I concede that at once, and I shall endeavour to follow his example. In the first place, so far as rule 14 is concerned, upon which a great deal has been said, I cannot see that it has any bearing upon the question. The argument, so far as I have been able to understand it—and I hope I understand it correctly—was that inasmuch as disorder in the committee can only be censured by the House on receiving a report thereof, that particular provision contains a repeal of any previous usage which would have enabled the Speaker to take the Chair under the rules which were brought into force as prevailing in the British House of Commons in 1867. There was no proceeding of that kind on this occasion—absolutely none. If the action of the Speaker can be justified, as I think it can, it is to be justified on the ground that a very grave condition of disorder prevailed. True, that condition had not been brought to the attention of the Speaker by way of motion of censure or report. But the intervention of the Speaker was not based on any consideration of that kind. So, it seems to me, rule 14 has nothing to do with the case. The action of the Speaker is to be justified on the ground that a scene of very grave disorder was then taking place, and that the Speaker, being responsible primarily for order in the House, had the right to intervene under the usages of Parliament for the purposes of restoring order which had been lost. Two cases have been cited, that of 1675 and that of 1810. My hon. friend from Pictou (Mr. Macdonald), has endeavoured to throw more or less discredit upon the precedent of 1675, because he connects it in some way or other with the removal of the mace by the Protector. He is a little astray in Mr. BORDEN.

his dates; there were a good many years intervening. Further than that, he will remember that the period to which he alludes, the seventeenth century, is celebrated for having created some of the very greatest safeguards of the liberties of the British people, liberties which we have inherited. That is one precedent, an absolutely plain precedent. It is said that the Speaker—

—very opportunely and prudently, rising from his seat near the bar, in a resolute and slow pace, made his three respects through the crowd, and took the Chair.' The mace was laid upon the table; the disorder ceased; and the Speaker stated that it was to bring the House into order again that, 'though not according to order,' he had taken the Chair.

The meaning of the expression: 'not according to order,' is not absolutely plain to me. I do not know whether he meant that it was not according to the order of the House, or whether he meant that it was not according to the order of the committee, that progress should be reported and that the Speaker should be brought in the Chair in the usual way. In the other case to which allusion has been made, I was not able to follow the contention of the hon. member for South Wellington (Mr. Guthrie), who made a very ingenious argument with regard to that particular case, but one which, it seems to me, could not be sustained. There were two distinct breaches of order; the first one had resulted in the Speaker being called to the Chair, and the member being excluded; afterwards when the House was again in committee that member returned, and the Speaker, without progress having been reported or any report having been made to him, resumed the Chair and took proceedings which resulted in the member in question being removed by the Sergeant-at-Arms. The hon. member for South Wellington, as I understand his statement, said the Speaker might regard that as a continuing disorder, but I cannot see why he could so regard it, because there were two scenes of disorder, each absolutely and distinctly separated from the other. The first incident had been absolutely closed before the second took place, and the doctrine of continuing disorder which my hon. friend has invoked does not seem to me at all applicable to the case. It has been said by my right hon. friend that May has not read it that way. So far as I am concerned, and, I think, so far as my right hon. friend is concerned, we should agree that if the journals of the House say one thing, and Sir Erskine May says another, the journals of the House should be accepted as the authority. We are all capable, I assume, of reading and understanding the record of the House in that regard, and the record of the House, according to