

less able to protect themselves than their larger ones. In general they have extensive territories, sometimes widely scattered; they have resources which are of importance to other states; their territory is usually of strategic importance to their larger neighbours. They have not, however, the means to defend themselves single-handed. They must look to some kind of association with other states to maintain their security, and indeed their national integrity. The simplest kind of association is of course a straight military alliance. But if this is the simplest, it is also the least satisfactory form of security for the smaller members of the partnership. It is only, therefore, by placing their security arrangements in the wider framework of a more general international structure that the secondary states can avoid endangering their own safety by the very measures which are designed to protect them. For a great power, membership in a successful international organization is not a matter of life and death. Its security in the long run rests on its own resources, and even a major war does not threaten it with permanent obliteration. I think it is true also that the very small powers are concerned in a less vital way with international organization than the middle states. The independence of a small power is never of such a character that its great neighbours cannot immediately dominate it if an emergency arises. For the middle powers, however, an insecure world is one which carries continually not only the danger of war, but the danger that the military and political strategy of a world in conflict will destroy its unity and rob it of its independence. For this reason the stakes are very high for middle powers in an international security organization; their concern for an organization that adequately reflects their needs and represents their position is no mere pretension.

In the United Nations, this problem has presented itself to the middle powers in two ways. It has arisen first in the form of constitutional questions, which are important not merely because of legalistic arguments, but because the Charter gives a blueprint of the political structure to be created. The second way in which the problem has presented itself is in more practical terms during the operations of the organization itself.

The preparatory work for the United Nations Charter was done by a committee of the great powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the document which emerged from Dumbarton Oaks was in important respects unsatisfactory to states which did not hold this rank. Three questions of particular importance arose during the early discussions of the Charter and were matters of great concern to the middle powers when they had an opportunity to discuss, during the meetings at San Francisco, the draft drawn up by the Great Powers. All three of these questions concerned the Security Council, the only body provided with a mandatory authority under the Charter and the only body which has the constitutional power to impose sanctions and, indeed, to move troops. It also has the theoretical power to command the resources of the member states if these are needed by it in its efforts to deal with an emergency. It is not surprising, therefore, that states which were likely to be involved in operations initiated by the Security Council should be concerned to see that their interests were properly represented before that body. This general problem, affecting all three of the constitutional questions I have in mind, was clearly stated by the Canadian representative to the San Francisco Conference in the following terms:

"The powers which the proposals would vest in the Security Council to call upon all members to join in the imposition of sanctions - military, economic and diplomatic - raise especially difficult problems for secondary countries with wide international interests. It is likely that if sanctions have to be imposed against an aggressor, the active collaboration of some states not on the Security Council will be needed. Let me contrast the position in this respect of the great powers on the one hand and of the