

place in an institutional and procedural framework that would "enable the distinct character of the European entity to be respected." In 1976, the Tindemans Report made the point explicitly by calling for members to present a united front to the outside world and to act in common in all the main fields of their external relations. It would be fair to say that in the past these recommendations have been honoured as much in their breach as in their acceptance. For example, in international organizations such as the U.N. there appears to be no strong record of common voting.⁸ This of course is in stark contrast to matters that fall within the Common Commercial Policy where the Commission negotiates on the basis of a common position for the Union as a whole.

As agreed at Maastricht, the current state of affairs is that once common positions have been defined member states are to ensure that their national policies are in conformity with them, and they are to uphold these common positions in international organizations and at international conferences. The obligatory character of the Maastricht requirements perhaps accounts for the fact that the number of common positions that have been formally adopted remains rather small. On the other hand, to a greater or lesser extent, the EPC/CFSP has affected the "culture" of foreign policy making in all the member countries. High level political networking and routine transgovernmental contacts have had their effect on how the national interest is defined. For most members, foreign policy is increasingly filtered through the European screen, and at the very least member states must take the Union context into account when departing from the majority view of their partners. Nonetheless, this has not prevented many notable instances of members deciding to go it alone!

A signal weakness of the CFSP has been in the area of consultation and representation with respect to third parties. The practice has grown up of organizing contacts between E.U. ambassadors in the various capitals to which they are accredited and the foreign ministry of the host country, as they have also between E.U. missions accredited to international organizations. The effectiveness of these contacts seems to vary from one capital to another. It is of course a two-way process, and some host foreign ministries make greater efforts than others to work with E.U. member embassies on matters of mutual interest. It is however in Brussels that third parties have their greatest contact with the E.U. On matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the European Community, the Commission is reasonably well organized to deal with the large number of missions that non-member countries have accredited to the Union. In contrast, the intergovernmental character of the CFSP has inhibited the development of institutionalized and comprehensive lines of communication with interested outsiders. A large burden is placed on the

⁸I know of no comprehensive study of the voting patterns of E.U. members in international organizations. Nuttall, *op cit.*, p.138, states that the record in the General Assembly in 1975 was of 65% voting together and 55% in 1976. However, the prospect of systematic joint voting on the part of Union member states in international organizations is of concern to Canada and others. In many fora, such a development would seriously degrade the ability of Canada to influence outcomes when faced by a solid bloc of fifteen (and in the future perhaps more) votes determined on the basis of CFSP procedures. With whom would Canada caucus?