

attempted to set up joint police patrols with the Gendarmerie. Strength of UNAMIR at this time is 2,486.

7 April

The SC met, but it had little information on events on the ground in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda. They decided to take no decisions until they had better intelligence. However reports of massacres are starting to pour in. At this stage, UNAMIR had a complement of approximately 2300 armed with light weapons. Some of the troops like the Bangladeshi were not at all prepared for a shooting war. Furthermore, the formal UNAMIR mandate and terms of engagement remained limited to self defense, albeit aggressive self defense if they opted to get out.

8 April

The RPF representative met with the NZ president of the SC to warn against the UN taking a more forceful role that would impede the advance of the RPF. He also asked for warnings of UN flights so that RPF forces would not shoot them down.

The SC met and had a broad discussion but took no decisions. The SG asked the SC to consider changing UNAMIR's mandate and increase the size of the force by 2-3 battalions in order to effectively evacuate UNAMIR/UN staff/foreign nationals. He stated that the situation had calmed and there were no further UN dead since the 7th. Discussion about a mandate change to have UNAMIR evacuated was also postponed particularly as the FC and others in Rwanda wanted to wait 24 hours to assess developments.

Nigeria argued in the other direction, asking for a multinational intervention force. This being Friday, the SC felt that if the ceasefire held, that they would not meet until Monday otherwise they would reconvene on Saturday.

Outside the SC, the RPF repeated in a milder form the warning given earlier to NZ as President of the SC. They denied moving forces through the DMZ, and they had moved their battalion out of Kigali (previously stationed there as part of the Arusha Peace Accord process)

8 April

Without any warning to UNHQ, the UNSC or UNAMIR, 190 French national troops landed and secured the airport without significant resistance. Another 400 arrived April 9th and assumed responsibility for the airport tower and operated it in cooperation with the RG forces. Similarly, 240 Belgian national troops arrived early the 10th followed by a Belgian battalion that night, for total of approximately 700.

9 April

The situation in Kigali had stabilized somewhat as there was no new UN casualties in the previous 24 hrs. Quite clearly the main problem was rampaging PG and the militia. UNAMIR was unable to enter many parts of the city.

In the SC there was a suggestion that the SC should issue a statement endorsing the unilateral French and Belgian humanitarian efforts to evacuate expatriates. France, Belgium (from outside of the chamber), the UK and the US blocked such a statement on the grounds that this was "self-defence" and of no concern to the SC. Such a reaction raised suspicions amongst African countries and the RPF particularly as France and Belgium maintained that they had cleared their arrival with the Rwandan authorities, one must assume they meant the Presidential Guard commanded by MGen Augustine Bizimungu (also RGF Chief of Staff).

With differences of opinion and a lack of coherent information, the SC elected not to discuss UNAMIR's mandate. USG Riza felt satisfied that the FC had been given greater latitude to include the protection of Rwandan civilians where possible. The US position at this point was that UNAMIR should remain in its location in case it needed to evacuate civilians overland.

The Belgians said their UN troop contingent would stay, but wanted UNAMIR to be more proactive in protecting