

equalled greater reassurance which equalled greater stability. The reverse appears to have been true in the North Korean case. There, the combination of US spy satellite technology and highly sophisticated analysis by IAEA inspectors revealed early in 1993 that Pyongyang had been lying about the nature of its nuclear programme centred on Yongbyon, ninety kilometres north of Pyongyang. Analysts have speculated that the North Koreans failed to appreciate the subtlety of IAEA tests and that, alarmed by the prospect of further revelatory inspections, they decided to threaten withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.³¹

One of the techniques used by the Nazis in their death camps was hope and hope dashed. At the very moment when all seemed lost, hope was rekindled. Much the same can be said for the negotiations which ensued following Pyongyang's March decision. To what extent the liturgy of resistance and concession has been carefully orchestrated or is simply symptomatic of a beleaguered regime opportunistically exploiting its diminished range of options is hard to say. Whatever the case, negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang constitute a fascinating case study in foreign policy decision-making.³²

One of Pyongyang's long term goals has been to decouple Washington from Seoul. The Russians tried to do the same thing with Tokyo but without success. North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has provided Kim Il Sung with the bargaining power to marginalize Seoul and deal more or less directly with Washington. It would appear that the Americans have continued to consult with their South Korean and Japanese allies but the principal decision making has taken place in the American and North Korean capitals.³³

The North Koreans had ninety days in which to confirm their withdrawal from the NPT.