

and, to a lesser extent, interaction and makes no explicit effort to locate itself in any type of institutionalist context. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any good reason why the minimalist account could not be viewed in terms of both realist and strong institutionalist (strong liberal and constructivist) perspectives. This would necessitate, however, a great deal more conscious conceptual work on how confidence building works as seen from the information-oriented minimalist point of view. No such effort has as yet been undertaken.

31. "The new international context also imposes 'non-traditional' threats, in particular, threats that transcend political borders and affect whole regions or even the globe. International crime and disease, global warming and mass involuntary migration are examples of the more negative aspects of greater global integration." (Canada, *Canada in the World: Government Statement*, Ottawa: 1995, p.3).

"Comprehensive security" is a broad concept that embraces "economic, social, political and military cooperation; the development of mutual trust through military confidence building and the lowest possible level of armaments; the peaceful settlement of differences; open markets; transnational issues cooperation, such as transportation, communications, energy, science and technology, environmental protection, human migration, combating crime and terrorism; and a preparedness to contribute to security in neighbouring areas." (From an untitled, unofficial Department of Foreign Affairs working paper. This view does not necessarily reflect official Canadian Government policy.)

32. *Verification In All Its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification*, Report of the Secretary General. General Assembly Document A/50/377 (22 September 1995), p. 18. Emphasis added. Note that this definition is of the verification *process*.

33. Although international agencies and other organizations may perform a compliance assessment and adjudication role, state decision makers are, at least in principle, the final arbiters of compliance decisions. They may lack the resources to make a technical judgement and may rely upon a mediating specialist body to assist in this role, but state decision makers bear the final responsibility for such decisions. This may change

in the future and some bodies such as the IAEA already brush up against this distinction.

34. Cooperative monitoring:

"involves the collection, analysis and sharing of information among parties to an agreement. ... Technologies incorporated into a cooperative monitoring regime must be capable of being shared among all parties, and all parties must receive equal access to data or information acquired by the system. Use of such technologies facilitates implementation of agreements by providing the capability to observe relevant activities, to define and measure agreed-upon parameters, to record and manage information and to carry out inspections using standardized monitoring systems Because it may be shared, the results of cooperative monitoring can have great utility in open discussions of compliance. It should be noted, however, that States that participate in cooperative monitoring arrangements generally retain the right to make compliance decisions themselves, using all available information, whether from shared technologies or national technical means."

From: *Verification In All Its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification*, p. 74. The cooperative monitoring idea is most directly associated with the Cooperative Monitoring Center of Sandia National Laboratory.