

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

and deliver mankind from the burden of this dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction. In this endeavour, the Paris Declaration is a programme of action, from all points of view.

In Paris, 149 States came out in favour of redoubled efforts for the prohibition of chemical weapons, to be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament. One hundred and forty-nine States demanded that the convention should be concluded at the earliest date, and they called upon all States to make an appropriate contribution towards achieving that end. My country is fully committed to what was agreed upon in Paris. It is among the States which have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and we have introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. We continue our efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe - an area of ultra-high weapons density - because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution. We are prepared to sign the chemical weapons convention immediately after its completion.

The USSR's cessation of its chemical weapons production, and its announcement that it will unilaterally start the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles this year, is a significant advance to foster the speedy continuation of our negotiations. In that light, we are all the more concerned, frankly speaking, over decisions on the production of binary weapons. None the less, we have to step up our efforts so that 1989 will become a crucial year for the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

For the achievement of a real breakthrough, it is imperative now to focus the work of the Conference even more on solving the still pending essential issues. As we see it, these issues include:

Firstly, harmonization of the verification régimes as set forth in the text of the draft convention. Verification must be adequate, effective and feasible - which means it must give sufficient assurance of compliance with the convention; the methods of inspection and monitoring must be highly reliable, and their costs affordable and appropriate to their objectives. It must be clarified whether the types of inspections so far provided for in the draft convention, namely routine and challenge inspections, are sufficient or whether they ought to be complemented by others, for example ad hoc inspections. Experience gathered in the context of trial inspections, including those carried out in my country, may be used for taking a decision of principle in that regard.

Secondly, completion of the provisions concerning challenge inspection. They are indeed an essential element for the verification system.

Thirdly, the order of destruction for chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. This is a crucial aspect of ensuring the principle of undiminished security during the period of destruction.

Fourthly, agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. This organ will have to take important political decisions in future daily work in the implementation of the convention being negotiated.