actively take steps to help her, either by leaving American soil and joining the Canadian forces, or by giving trouble among the Americans. But what are these among so many? They would be without organization, and it would not be safe to count on more than perhaps a reinforcement of one hundred thousand men from that source. If so, what would be our strength? We could turn out 750,000 men on a pinch. Where are their weaponswhere are the guns? Where is the cavalry? Surely if there is any danger from across the line, it is time to look into these matters. Forewarned is forearmed, and we gain nothing by depreciating either the resources or character of our possible opponents. As to whether there is any danger from the Americans is not quite so easy to answer. They are undoubtedly aggressive enough. They are unwieldy, like a great overgrown boy who has not reached maturity, but who has in him all the strength and vitality necessary to make a man. He may be clumsy and may not know his strength, but he soon learns it, and then his impulse is to try that strength. Nations are governed by the same impulses as individuals, so it is not impossible that the States may make some attempt to only chance would be to be more ready than they, and a forward movement on our part, anticipating one from them, coupled with the cooperation of the fleet on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and of a flotilla of gunboats up the Mississippi and on the lakes, and we might do the order of the day. something. In any event we will do our best and apply to our own case Shakespeare's lines from Henry V.:

If we are marked to die, we are enow To do our country loss; and if to live, The fewer men the greater share of honour.

R. E. K.

## PARIS LETTER.

THE death of Marshal de Moltke occupies of course all attention. For four years he has been only a living trophy. Has he founded a school, left a "double portion of his spirit" in a disciple? On whose shoulders has his mantle fallen? Europe is no more to-day what it was in 1870, than what it was in 1806, when Helmuth de Moltke, then six years of age, witnessed his father's house at Lubeck, pillaged by the triumphant French. Napoleon was then in the height of his fame, and vowed, like a Clesar of old, to dedicate a temple to his own glory; and he selected the Madeleine at Paris, wherein to enshrine his genius, and to erect an altar for the idolatrous crowd. Nine years later Napoleon was annihilated; in the course of fifty-six more, France lay moribund at the feet of de Moltke, that is of Germany. Do Jenas and Sedans repeat themselves? That's a daily reflection with Germans and French. How avert them? By being scientifically prepared for war, de Moltke maintained; for war, as he said in the Reichstag, is "a holy and divine institution, which develops in men noble sentiments, honour, virtue, courage, and prevents their lapsing into materialism." However, from the Israelites, down through the classic, religious to modern wars, the beauties of war, if apparent, are not dissimilar. Fighting is an attribute of man; it will only disappear with his disappearance. The Interview-pump has been worked on the marshals respecting the deceased. "He inflicted much injury on us," was all MacMahon had to say. "He was a terrible enemy: engineer rather than soldier, who had the good fortune to arrive, when the art of war was being transformed, and armaments modified," was Canrobert's verdict. The marshals forget that they did not, though possessing the power, utilize also these metamorphoses under the Second Empire. Marshal de Moltke never held that a campaign could be pre-arranged, like a game of chess, as the consecutive acts of war are not the results of pre-meditation. It has been observed that he is the best general who commits fewest faults. The deceased soldier went no further than to lay down that strategy consists in preparing the means of combat: well combine the first movements of the army, and to bear in mind that a single fault committed in the concentration of that army remains irreparable throughout the Campaign. Canrobert is satisfied that France has her de Moltke in General Miribel, now in his fifty-ninth year. Alexander died aged 33, Cæsar 57, and Napoleon 52. It is to be presumed the Germans have likewise their coming victory man. Impartial observers are agreed that the Teutons are better fitted, by their stategetic railways, than the French for the more rapid concentration But the undisclosed de Moltkes on both sides have yet to win their spurs—and may they never have the opportunity. The few far-seeing journals here keep before the eyes of Frenchmen that de Moltke's life-triumphs were largely aided by his having an autocratic Government at his back. Will French democracy in the hour of any future national peril be able to sustain its chiefs by a kindred unity of absolutism? That's a grave problem for mental cud-chewing.

The cremation question is receiving "ardent" attention. The fair sex will soon be all converted to the doctrine of incineration. Some husbands decline to comply with the last wishes of their wives, not to be "interred"—especially if not really dead. A few recent "buried alive" cases have revived the agitation about precipitate inhunations. A leading physician has addressed an open letter to Home Minister Constans, asserting that in every twenty cases of officially certified deaths there is but one on an defended, to be carried by infantry alone.

only not bear arms against England, but who would also average presenting the physiologically conclusive evidences of death. When a death takes place in France the relatives must at once make known the event at the Mayor's office, accompanied with a certificate from the medical attendant, setting forth the nature of the ailment. Legally the physician may decline to reveal the malady under which his patient succumbed; for social reasons he exercises the right of professional secrecy. On receipt of the notification of the decease, the Government doctor is advised; he proceeds to the residence of the defunct, casts a summary glance at the corpse, and signs the permit for burial. It is quite common for persons to leave instructions in their will that such or such a surgeon be called in to practise a post-mortem examination on their remains, to place the question of death beyond doubt. Holding a mirror under the nose, applying red hot iron to the heel, or irritating the palm of the feet, are not conclusive death detectors. The only certain test is the odour of decomposition, and this is frustrated by freely sprinkling the mortuary chamber with carbolic acid. Halt-dead houses in the cemetery, where the body can lie in the unclosed coffin some time before being interred or cremated, are now strongly recommended. Cardinal Donnet, a quarter force Canada from her position of semi-independence. Our of a century ago in the Senate, advocated this preventive measure, the more so as in his student days he was placed in his coffin and narrowly escaped being buried alive; and he was quite conscious of all that was taking place. The Senators congratulated him upon his escape, and passed to

A controversy is taking place over the "Eglisophone." Now this is not the name either of a new patent medicine, or of a freshly discovered antediluvian animal. telephone connecting with a theatre or a concert can convey the "voices" to persons at home as well as to posterity. The "Eglis" or Church-o-phone is simply to place the sick or the stay-at-home in connection with a place of worship. M. Renan was asked his opinion: He declared that the idea was original and humorous, but feared that His Holiness would not sanction that fin de Siècle novelty. In any case it could never supersede auricular confession. Only telegraphic Papal benedictions, added the free and

easy cynic, were orthodox.

The students of the Ecole Centrale, from time immemorial, indulge in a carnival of their own every year, and known as the "Monôme." The latter is a contraction for the algebraic expression for the series of single term factors. With the students their Monôme has neither addition nor subtraction; they are all young civil engineers-M. Eiffel is one of the most distinguished graduates of the college—and starting from the Square du Temple, Marie Antoinette's prison, they marched in Indian file, hands upon each others shoulders; no addition or subtraction being made to affect this sea-serpent procession. The unknown quantity is represented by the small boys at large. At the head of the procession is an immense figure of a cube, twenty-seven feet high—in card-board; this juggernault is followed by several symbols of engineering: windlasses, blast furnaces, etc., in similar raw material. Several of the students carry coloured Chinese lanterns on the ends of their canes, and all sing independent songs, and not a few indulge in jigs. Wending its way to the Bastille, the procession halts before the Beaumarchais Theatre. Only the alumni enter; tylers exclude the profane. The orchestra is composed of students, fiddles, whistles, jew's harps, etc. By students sitting on each others shoulders and laps accommodation is found for all. The artistes are amateur students. There are plenty of singers, but the backbone of the performance is the Revue, an extravaganza of all the college incidents during the year; each actor "makes up" to represent a professor, and the popularity of the latter may be gauged by the cheers, cat-calls, hisses, hoots and nicknames. A supper follows, where the dishes receive mathematical and technical names. It makes the old feel young again in presence of the exuberance of boys, who will, and may they ever, be—boys. Such is the "Westminster Play" and "Dulce Domum" of the future men who build Eiffel towers, construct railways and run factories.

### NAPOLEON'S CONTEMPLATED INVASION OF ENGLAND.

MR. MORRIS, in Macmillan for April, in his article "A Study of Nelson," referring to Napoleon's threatened invasion of England, says that "Napoleon's plan had many chances —for some time it was full of promise, and it must rank with his finest strategic conceptions. It failed because his fleets were exceedingly bad, and Villeneuve no more than a third-rate" admiral.

### THESIS.

I venture to differ from Mr. Morris. My thesis is: that Napoleon's contemplated invasion had no real chance of success; and that if he had succeeded in landing, it would have been one of his greatest strategic blunders.

NAPOLEON'S IGNORANCE OF A VITAL FACT.

Napoleon was totally unaware of the fact that England was then one of the strongest countries in the world for defensive purposes, owing to the greater number of its fields being bounded by thick hedge-rows and deep ditches, so that it practically abounded with rudely-constructed but very strong field-works, impossible, if resolutely

DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF ENGLAND.

Eighty-five years ago hedge-rows were far more numerous than now, and the fields generally were smaller. A rough estimate would give six acres to the field, say 140 by 200 yards, with one or two gates in it. Up till recent times the average field would have had a ditch round it, say three feet deep and six feet wide on the level, then an earthen embankment, solidified during many generations, six or seven feet high from its top to the bottom of the ditch, and a thick line of hedge-row timber on the top, with a sprinkle of fair-sized trees. On the other side a similar ditch, and usually there would be water in both the ditches. Even a trespassing boy could not always easily overcome such impediments. Imagine on the near side three rows of British soldiers armed with the old flint-lock and bayonet. As the aim of the old musket was not reliable for more than 90 yards, the British usually reserved their fire until the enemy was close at hand. This partly explains Marshal Soult's statement that the British musketry-fire was more destructive than that of the French.

If the soldiers sheltered themselves in the ditch, no bullet could hit them. If they stood in the ditch firing through the hedge, two-thirds of their bodies would be protected. Now, imagine on the far side three lines of Frenchmen advancing to storm the hedge-row. They would be thoroughly exposed, the same as the British were at Bunker's Hill. If there was no foe on the other side, it would be no easy matter to scramble through such a hedge; but, with British troops beyond, it would be impossible, and the assaulting party would be repulsed with a heavy list of casualties, while those of the defenders would be but few. In a selected battle-field the nearest hedge-rows on the enemies' side would be levelled.

#### ILLUSTRATED BY WATERLOO.

Readers will readily comprehend this by imagining the field of Waterloo to have been covered with similar hedge-rows and ditches, instead of being, as it was, open to all arms. Napoleon that morning had 75,000 men, and Wellington 67,000, all told. Napoleon's great superiority in cavalry would have been unavailing; and the same, to a great extent, would have applied to his more numerous artillery. He would have had to depend solely upon his The field of battle was about 3,400 yards along its front. Wellington had, including the King's German legion, 20,000 British infantry. A line of men three deep extending 3,400 yards would require 13,750 men, so that if he had decided to rely solely upon his British troops, he could, after garrisoning his posts, have lined all his front with them. But then the value of his foreigners mostly newly raised—behind such earthworks would have been double what they were in the open. Napoleon would never have had the slightest chance of victory. Neither would he have been totally routed-protected himself by such earthworks, he could have made an orderly retreat. English hedge-rows and ditches would have doubled Wellington's defensive strength and, diminished Napoleon's offensive power by one-half.

# NAPOLEON SHUT HIS EYES.

Napoleon knew of his narrow escape from Nelson, and was well aware that if they had met at set the expedition to Egypt would have been a disastrous failure. He also well knew that no other troops in the world but British would, when attacked in the night, as they were at Alexandria, have thoroughly vanquished his veterans, the heroes of so many victories. Yet he, with great lack of judgment, ignored the effect upon the fintilla of the possibly unexpected appearance of Nelson, and he also undervalued the British troops until mid-day at Waterloo, when, to his amazement, he saw his more numerous veterans driven headlong down the heights by Picton's fighting few. He told British officers subsequently that the British infantry were the best in the world, and that attacking them was like charging against a brick wall. This statement tallied with that of Marshal Soult: that it did not matter whether the English began at the top or the bottom of the hill; when the fighting ended they were found at the top.

UNFORTUNATE THAT NAPOLEON DID NOT VENTURE.

From a British, as well as from a European point of view, it was a great misfortune that Napoleon did not land his army in England. Had he landed, the great war would have ended at least eight years earlier; thus saving more than a million of lives and untold treasure.

### NAPOLEON A MILITARY GAMBLER.

The Emperor was a very able and very energetic man, possessing uncontrolled power and vast resources. During nearly all his career he personally combatted against those who were neither able nor energetic. But, with all his gifts, he was a military gambler. His expedition to Egypt is a striking proof of this. Had he encountered Nelsonand the fleets once almost touched—the affair would have been soon decided; and he would, if not captured, have returned to France thoroughly disgraced, as the author of one of the greatest failures of the century. Take, also, the case of the invasion of Russia. He knew from experience the stubborn bravery of the Russian troops, and the extreme difficulty of feeding such a huge army. His main dependence was that Alexander would yield as he had done before. All was staked upon a throw of the dice-half a million of lives and his empire-against the extension of the sphere of his fulminations with respect