

of the Torpedo Company of the Royal Engineers are stationed—but also, it is understood, at Malta and Halifax, Nova Scotia, with a view to ascertain the value of torpedoes for defence at those stations. It is expected that the men who have been employed at Woolwich and Portsmouth with the torpedoes will be sent to Halifax and Malta. The officers expected at Portsmouth to witness the experiments will be quartered in the Naval College.—*Broad Arrow*, 12th April.

The Lords of the Admiralty have given directions to the authorities at the various dockyards that the electric firing apparatus for torpedoes supplied to Her Majesty's ships is, in future to be fitted as soon as the vessel is placed in the first division of the steam reserve, under the immediate superintendence of the commander or lieutenant of the naval Torpedo Schools at Portsmouth, and the fittings so arranged are not to be altered without the permission of the Admiralty. A set of instructions for conducting electric firing has also been issued to the fleet, the Admiralty being of opinion that it is very desirable that one uniform system in carrying out the practice should be adopted throughout the Service.—*Broad Arrow*, 19th April.

The above paragraphs are the latest on torpedoes, which we have to present to our readers, and they suggest serious reflections as to the value of this weapon, as an agent in warlike operations. We cannot conceive a line of battle, ahead or in column without the idea being suggested that every commanding officer of a vessel will be quite as intently engaged watching the vessels of his own squadron as those of the enemy, and that his greatest danger, if the weapon is of any value, will be from his friends. Suppose an enemy's ship, as will be frequently the case, is passing between two British vessels, what certainty can the torpedo operators have that the missile, if it can be discharged, will not pass ahead, astern, or under her without coming into contact? What might, or possibly would be the consequences in such a case? for it must be proved that the missile will follow the curve of the wave after it is discharged, so as to keep at the same depth below the surface of the water, to its point of contact, as it had with its initial velocity, the tendency in water being always to deflect any missile or body moving through it with a greater motion than itself presents at the time. This problem has never yet been solved by *Torpedoes*, and as long as it remains so the weapon will be found valueless in practice.

The following paragraph from *Broad Arrow* of 5th April, shows how the proposed trial of Marshal BAZAINE is viewed in military circles and how difficult a part a soldier has to play when party political considerations are involved. It does not matter whether he has set an example of unshaken fidelity like the French Marshal or whether he has played the part of traitor or scoundrel like Trochu, political expediency demands an example, and the gallant soldier must be the victim while the scoundrels

sneak into that obscurity from which they never should have emerged.

Individuality—by which euphonious name—impudence, self-assertions and what is vulgarly known as *check*, but well understood to cover all rascality, is a predominant feature of the age, and in the case before us has tended to the ruin of France in no ordinary degree. GAMBETTA, a presuming and mischievous demagogue, and Trochu a traitor Charlatan and no soldier, by dint of pure *check* pushed themselves to the head of affairs immediately after the surrender of the Emperor Louis NAPOLEON at Sedan; the former with an impudence peculiarly his own assumed to interfere with the military operations of such of the French General Officers as possessed brains and energy not to despair of the future of their country, and in one notorious case so disastrously as to neutralize the chance of raising the siege of Paris, the other made Governor of that city totally failed as a man of honor and a soldier in his duty to the Empress Regent, assumed on her flight the full reins of power and miserably failed, both as a administrator and military chief. If the French people want a victim why not strike at the traitors and scoundrels and let the honest man alone. The following is the *Broad Arrow* paragraph.

"Our military readers who have taken an interest in the incidents of the late Franco-Prussian war, will regret to hear that on Thursday last, General Chanzy announced, on the authority of General Cissey, that the Government had received the report of the Committee of Capitulations upon the case of Marshal Bazaine, and had decided that the Marshal should be tried. It is also stated that the committee had granted the request of General Ducrot for a copy of the report of the Council of Inquiry on the capitulations of Sedan, in order to reply to the accusations of the German Staff. Without staying to inquire whether Bazaine was equal to the emergency, when the command of the Army of the Rhine devolved upon him, we feel it impossible to withhold the expression of our sympathy in circumstances which there is but too much reason to believe denote a foregone conclusion. In England at least, all competent critics have long since come to the conclusion that the army he commanded after the event of Gravelotte was doomed either to destruction or unconditional surrender. To try the Marshal on the absurd charge of treason in the present temper of Frenchman is, we fear, to condemn him beforehand. The real crime of Marshal Bazaine was his faithfulness to his oath at the time when he had no certain information of events that had happened at Paris, and it is, as in some measure representing the military spirit that we raise a feeble voice in his behalf. It is true that if Metz had held out a few days longer, the Second Army would have failed to effect its junction with the army of the Duke of Mecklenburg, and advance against Orleans; but on the other hand it is equally true that if the Republican Minister of War, M. Gambetta, had not rashly interfered with the operations of General D'Aurelle de Paladines, the Army of Orleans would have held its entrenchments, and eventually, perhaps, have raised the siege of Paris. The reasons for trying Gambetta are quite as cogent as the reasons for trying Bazaine, but then Gambetta, fortunately for himself, was not the representative of a lost cause."

It would appear that England's greatest ironclad has had a narrow escape from a repetition of the accident to the *Captain* with variations. Whether the loss of life would have been as great is another question. But the following paragraph which we take from the *Broad Arrow* of the 12th April, shows the danger of craft with so little extra available power of flotation as the vessels of the iron clad fleet generally have.

"The interest we take in the *Devastation* will account for our knowledge of a fact which is not included in the items of intelligence contained under the name of that remarkable craft in our naval columns, and which explains perhaps the postponement of her trial till the beginning of next week, otherwise scarcely accounted for by the time requisite for the crew to "shake down into their places." It appears that one of the bilge water valves was accidentally left open by a ship-wright who had left the vessel after working on her. If our information is correct, it was simply owing to the fact of a stoker accidentally looking in as he passed by that the discovery was made, and the water was then rising so rapidly that in another half hour, we are told, the ship would have been water-logged and perhaps sunk. In this we are compelled to believe there is a little exaggeration, as it is not credible that a structure so vast and costly, and so many precious lives, could by any possibility have been left at the mercy of so small an accident. That a mishap of the kind mentioned did occur we have no reason to doubt, though it is not generally known, and the authorities are doing their best to keep the matter quiet.

In its issue of 7th inst. the *Globe* has given its readers another version of the *Militia frauds and official negligence* case, but with the milder heading this time of *Militia Scandals*. As the veracity of that journal is not immaculate, its readers will not be surprised to find that the principal stress is now laid on the fact that Colonel ROBERTSON ROSS did not get a document which was received by the officer in command at Head Quarters four days before the Adjutant General reached Ottawa on his return from British Columbia. To complicate matters more the *Globe* says this document was directed by Lieut. Colonel CASSATT, Deputy Adjutant General of Military District No. 7, to Lieut. Colonel STUART, the confidential clerk or secretary of the Adjutant General.

Now we know the Deputy Adjutant General to be brought up in a good school as a soldier, and we are quite sure he would never be guilty of the irregularity of addressing an official document, containing the copy of the proceedings of a Court of enquiry to a mere clerk or secretary when the address and standing of the officer in command was well known. In its anxiety to spatter all concerned with mud, the *Globe* does not hesitate to report the direct falsehood that a fraud was committed, the trifling difference that it was only attempted, and failed because the Adjutant General had devised such an effective system of checks, that it could not succeed,