

*reasonableness* of Canon Farrar's views, we cannot accept them necessarily as *proof*.

Much the same may be said of the second sermon—"Is life worth living?"—where he endeavours to show that if the majority of mankind are to be lost, or even if there is no existence beyond the grave, the comparatively small amount of happiness to be attained by the great majority of mankind, especially in this intellectual age, would not make life worth living, and that with most men, as with Judas, it were better that they had never been born. Here again the subjective must be measured by the objective, and therefore such reasoning could only carry weight when the reasonable probability that it is in accordance with God's revealed will, is also shown. In the third and fourth sermons—"Hell, what it is not," and "Are there few that be saved?" as well as in the Preface and Excurses, the writer comes directly to his own peculiar views, and (although the subjective treatment of the subject pervades the whole volume), gives us his reasons for believing that they are sustained, or at least not contradicted by Scripture. They depend mainly upon the translation of three Greek words—*Ἕρμνα*, *κρίσις* and *αἰώνιος*; which he objects to rendering as "hell," "damnation," and "everlasting," for the reason, he says, that as "English words they have utterly lost their original significance; that by nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand they are understood in a sense which I see to be demonstrably unscriptural and untrue; and that they attribute to the sacred writers, and to our blessed Lord Himself, meanings such as they never sanctioned, language such as they never used." Upon this point we are neither prepared nor disposed to say much; for the opinion of any one individual upon a point where learned men differ, could be neither of interest nor value to anyone. *Ἕρμνα*, he seems to think, should simply be rendered Gehenna; and a distinction made between the three words which are in the English version, indiscriminately translated Hell. In this we believe most scholars agree with him, as also upon the word *κρίσις*, and its compound, *κατακρίσις*, which should be rendered "judgment," or condemnation, "and if," he adds, "the word 'damnation' has come to mean more than these words do—as, to all but the most educated readers, is notoriously the case—then the word is a grievous mistranslation, all the more serious because it entirely and terribly perverts and obscures the real meaning of our Lord's utterances; and all the more inexcusable, at any rate for us with our present knowledge, because if the word 'damnation' were used as the rendering of the very same words in multitudes of other passages (where our translators have rightly translated them), it would make those passages at once impossible and grotesque." And in another part of the book he gives as an illustration, John viii, 10, where our Saviour might be made to say, "Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man damned thee?" But in regard to the word *αἰώνιος*, he does not to our mind make out nearly so clear or satisfactory a case. It may be quite true that the word originally signified *age*, *lasting*; but then there is no word in the Greek which absolutely signifies everlasting, and had our Lord wished to convey such an idea, he could scarcely have done more than said, as He did, "for ages." Again, this same word is admitted by Canon Farrar to be practically equivalent to everlasting, when speaking of the life of happiness hereafter; and his reasons for not giving it the same full