

the parties to realize that they could not depend indefinitely on an outside force for their security.

Then, in July 1974, the situation in Cyprus changed dramatically. In response to an attempted *coup d'état* against the Makarios administration by the Greek-led Cypriot National Guard, Turkey landed forces on Cyprus and rapidly occupied about 40 per cent of the island.

This altered radically the position of the peacekeeping force. It had been created to police the cease-fire between the two communities, but now the major confrontation was between the Turkish armed forces and the Cypriot National Guard. To cope with this situation, the Canadian contingent, along with those of the other contributing countries, was increased at the request of the UN Secretary-General. With this increase in size, the force was able to respond successfully to this new challenge and to keep further fighting to a minimum. Nevertheless, the situation today continues to be volatile, and renewed violence could occur at any time.

The experience in peace-keeping in Cyprus merits close study, for it reveals the basic problems in UN peacekeeping and peacemaking procedures.

Peace-keeping cannot be made a substitute for peacemaking. If it is to serve a useful purpose, peace-keeping must be accompanied by a parallel effort on the political level, especially by the parties most directly concerned, to convert the temporary peace that a peace-keeping force is asked to maintain into something more durable. If this is not done, peace-keeping will only perpetuate an uneasy status quo, which, in due course, is likely to break down, as it did in Cyprus. There, despite the presence of the peacekeeping force, fighting on an unprecedented scale finally occurred because the fundamental political problem remained unresolved. In addition, if the contributors to peace-keeping are faced with indefinite prolongation of their hazardous task, governments and their peoples, feeling themselves caught in a seemingly fruitless endeavour, will be less willing to respond to future requests to take part in peacekeeping operations. Although Canadians continue to appreciate the importance of peace-keeping, they are less inclined today to accept without question the burden of participation. Eleven years is a long time and, although negotiations towards a settlement were recently renewed, the end is not yet in sight.

It may be that we should also alter our approach to peace-keeping and peacemaking. Canada has traditionally followed the policy that, to be effective in peace-keeping, it is essential to remain *persona grata* with the two sides to the dispute and consequently to avoid