

to process and examine data from these nations, and the obligation of states parties to the agreement to furnish the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event on their territory -- these are the main elements of the eight-nation proposal which we believe should be incorporated, without further delay, in a draft treaty for ending all nuclear tests.

A Fundamental Principle Involved

Agreement on these points would narrow the differences separating the two sides to one major question: What is to be done if there is a dispute as to the nature of an event which has taken place in the territory of one of the parties to the agreement? It appears from new scientific data submitted last August at Geneva by the U.S.A. and Great Britain that the area of uncertainty where doubtful events could arise has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, controversy persists over the question of how to verify that no underground testing takes place. Technical problems which have been raised in the examination of this subject could not usefully be discussed in this Committee. However, there is a fundamental matter of principle which my Delegation is firmly convinced must be borne in mind by the nuclear powers in their negotiations in this field.

It is agreed, I think, that no foreseeable inspection system will fully meet the preoccupations of all parties to a test-ban agreement. What is needed then is a reasonable assurance that their interests will be protected. But this criterion cannot be applied exclusively to the risks which may be inherent in the treaty itself; it is equally important not to lose sight of the grave risks which humanity continues to run in the absence of such an agreement.

It has been alleged, for example, that a verification system involving "on-site" inspection could mean that espionage data would be collected by the inspectors. In my opinion, the possibility that the international inspectorate could be used in this way is exceedingly remote. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union would seriously contend that this risk compares in any way with the dangers which they themselves agree are inherent in continued testing.

Balancing Two Risks

It is also argued that the risk of a state evading its obligations under a nuclear-tests agreement must be reduced to a minimum. My Delegation fully recognizes the importance of this requirement, since a treaty which would not give assurances that states were living up to their commitments would be cause for continuing concern and tension rather than diminishing these factors as an effective agreement is intended to do. But the risk of evasion should also be balanced against the dangers mankind must live with in the absence of an agreement. If it is feared