

Moreover, Germany itself has agreed unconditionally not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological or chemical weapons; long-range aircraft, guided missiles, mines, warships, except some small ones for coastal defence.

This organization of defence forces on an international basis; this emphasis on collective rather than national action for security is another lesson which has been learned from history, and it is being applied.

If today the democracies are building up adequate defensive strength, it is in order to deter an aggressor by removing any illusion he may have that the democracies would be an easy victim. The Russians and their satellites have all together some 250 Army Divisions. For many years, the Soviet has also been organizing army, navy and airforce units in Eastern Germany, something their Canadian followers never mention. We in the West have no desire, and happily no need, to match them in numbers. But we do have the need and the intention to maintain sufficient strength to make aggression unlikely because clearly unprofitable. The decisions which we and our allies are taking about Western Germany will help in this regard by adding to our defensive strength and they involve no threat to the Russians or anybody else.

Nor is it true, of course, as Communist propagandists have also suggested, that the approval of these agreements will put an end to negotiations with the Russians. On the contrary, they make more likely the possibility of such negotiations being productive. Another of the lessons of history, of very recent history, is that the Soviet leaders, like the Nazis, waste no concessions on the weak, and that a policy of negotiating from strength, however violently the Kremlin may attack it, is the one thing that gets results.

But there is another area in which progress is essential, and this is the most fundamental of all. It lies in improving relations between states: in settling disputes peacefully, and in easing international tensions.

Tonight, as I speak to you, that part of the world where the tension seems greatest is far from Canada in miles, but close enough in every other way. It is as near as a Korean hillside or a field in Flanders, or an airman's grave in Malta.

So Canadians watch with anxiety developments in Washington and in Peking, off the coast of China and on the island of Formosa.

The policies now being worked out in Washington to deal with these matters are American, and Canada is not committed by them. Any obligation which we might have in regard to Formosa could arise only from our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations.