

our Assembly which dealt with this question.

One was a resolution of those members of the United Nations who had forces in Korea, participating in operations there. That resolution became known as the 21-Power Resolution. Canada was one of the sponsoring members of that resolution, which endorsed the steps that had been taken and the effort that had been made by the Unified Command in Korea and the other side for an armistice, and called on the other side to accept those proposals and to bring about an armistice.

There were two other resolutions from delegations from Mexico and Peru, which dealt with more specialized aspects of the question; and there was at the same time introduced by the Soviet Delegation a resolution which would have set up an 11-power commission representing both sides of the conflict, and which would have had authority to deal not only with the prisoners-of-war question but with Korea generally and indeed with other Asiatic questions. On the face of it, that resolution by the Soviet delegation may have seemed to be not without some aspects of reason and possibility. The 11-power commission had four Communist members but, in order to make quite certain that this 11-power commission would not be able to act, the Soviet, within a day of the introduction of this resolution, introduced an amendment to make it quite clear that that commission could act only by a two-thirds majority. A two thirds majority of eleven is seven and a quarter; that would have meant that eight members of the commission would have been required to agree in order to reach a decision. The meaning of that provision, of course, is quite obvious. It would have given the Soviet and their satellites a veto on all the actions and all the activities of the commission.

After the introduction of these four resolutions the Indian delegation, after consultation with a good many Asian and Arab delegations -and indeed other delegations-introduced a resolution which narrowed the issue before the Assembly and before the Political Committee to the prisoners-of-war question alone and left out of the resolution all that had gone on before and other aspects of the questions than that of prisoners of war. They produced a proposal which attempted to reconcile the two ideas, the one to which our side clung as right and just and the other which the Communists said was a sine qua non of any agreement on their part to a prisoners-of-war solution. Those two ideas were, on the one hand, the right to repatriation guaranteed under the Geneva Convention of 1949, and on the other the refusal to use force to drive prisoners-of-war back to Communist territories if they did not wish to go.

As to the first, although we had a great deal of discussion on the subject, I think it is quite clear, from the legal point of view, that the right of repatriation is guaranteed under the Geneva Convention in question. The right is clear, I think, and the right is unambiguous. It seems that the delegations which made that prisoners-of-war Convention -that is the Red Cross Convention in Geneva in 1949 -were at that time, quite naturally, thinking more of a future war when the problem would be forced retention rather than forced repatriation. The question of forced repatriation did not enter into their calculations at that