

up to the survival of the fittest, so may improved social conditions make the natural selection more like a natural resignation and less like a perpetual strife.

When the second pair came in contact with the first an understanding or contract was had, vague and perhaps merely implied as to its terms, but nevertheless an agreement. The determination in the minds of the two pairs of their future relations was the contract to be sooner or later made definite. What is this agreement? Is it reformable? Shall it be reformed? From this on let us take man to represent the individual pair, and being, of the two, perhaps the easier to handle. There was a time when sparseness of population made it possible for the parties to this agreement to neglect its provisions. That time is long past. The mutual relations of men require the most careful and sympathetic attention.

There are some who draw a distinction between man as an individual and as a member of society. In the one case he is considered, apparently, as a mere physical entity, in the other as a being for the first time endowed "with rights and liberties." But man in his physical condition is the same person in the State as out of it, and beyond his physical condition the State can not control him. It is contended by Mr. Ritchie, the distinguished author of "Darwinism and Politics," that "the individual apart from all relations to a community is a negation." And again he remarks, "The individual is thought of, at least spoken of, as if he had a meaning or significance apart from his surroundings and apart from his relations to the community of which he is a member." Surely to regard in this way the individual as a part of the State, as one would regard the arm as part of the human body, is a confusion of ideas. In opposition to Plato, Herbert Spencer holds that the individual in the State is not like a part of the human body to that body, because in the body there is a central sensorium, whilst in the State there is none. "Society," he says, "exists for the benefit of its members and not its members for the benefit of society." (Prin. of Sociology). But Mr. Spencer, it is said, does not mean an organism, as it is usually understood, but something less, as when he speaks of individuals as "bodies dispersed through an undifferentiated jelly." Nor does this after all differ much from Hobbes's theory of society which was that of voluntary combination.

Then again Mr. Ritchie, by way of still further supporting his definition of the individual, in quoting from Prof. Jevons's work, "The State in Relation to Labour," says: "The modern English citizen, who lives under the burden of the revised edition of the statutes, not to speak of innumerable municipal, railroad, sanitary and other by-laws, is, after all, an infinitely freer as well as noble being than the savage who is always under the despotism of physical want." Spinoza and Bagehot are also laid under contribution by him to prove that man is more free in the State than in solitude. In reply to this one can only say that man may be better for living in the State, but certainly he is not freer if freedom means exemption from the constraint of his fellowmen. And as to his being freer, because not under the despotism of physical want, one may assert that, comparing the bounty of nature in solitude and her bounty under the laws of society, the average man would fare better in solitude than he does under the State. Bountiful harvests under the State do not affect the condition of the average man in the same direct and instantaneous way. The juggling of middlemen and grain gamblers absorbs all that there is of bounty, which, in truth, ultimately turns up as capital in the hands of the capitalist. Freedom, I take it, is that condition in which a man does as he pleases, whether for good or evil, and the perfectly free man, free from physical ills and mental infirmities, as from physical constraint, assumes the maximum of moral responsibility. The State should not be considered as an organic or quasi-organic body, but as a number of free individuals and government in that State the sum of delegated protective privileges. The individual, then (including his wife), has, I assume, a moral right to his status, although, in his social relations, he can be dealt with in his physical capacity only. Enough to eat, enough to drink, and enough to wear are the proper subjects of social consideration. All else depends upon the moral desire for improvement in each one. And I submit that under these conditions there can be, properly speaking, no distinction drawn between man's existence as a member of society and

his existence as an independent individual entity. I will finish by drawing your attention to the present system.

Mr. Herbert Spencer: By One Who Does Not Know Him.

THE Review of Reviews gives, as the "Character Sketch of the Month," "Mr. Herbert Spencer, by one who knows him." This is a very readable sketch, which, on account of the cosmopolitan character of the journal, will bring Mr. Spencer's name and philosophy prominently before the world. Some people may think that, however appropriate it may be at any time to review Mr. Spencer and his works, he does not need greater prominence than he has already attained. He has been one of the leading figures in the world of science and philosophy for more than forty years. Fichte in the height of his career found in his native land a fully equipped university where his name was unknown, and it may be that, even in these days of newspapers, reviews, and controversial sermons, there are intelligent people in the English-speaking world who know nothing about Mr. Spencer, the great English philosopher. Those, however, who have read the leading reviews during the last quarter of a century must have sometimes felt that Mr. Spencer was always with them, either in his proper person or by means of some worshippers or critic. Mr. Spencer has attempted a gigantic task, he has toiled earnestly, and we must all rejoice that he conquered financial difficulties which would have crushed many men, and has come to a position of great honour and influence. There are two things of which Englishmen may be especially proud as they read this sketch, the fact that he has shown such heroic self-denial and patient courage in following out his great life-purpose, and the view that he takes of philosophy as "unified knowledge" by means of which man seeks to solve the mystery of the universe. Dr. Fairbairn, one of the keenest of Mr. Spencer's critics, says: "In many respects its constructive and comprehensive character entitles it to admiration and praise." Whatever then may be the final judgment as to Mr. Spencer's contributions to philosophy he has had the pleasure of seeing his system become a great power in quickening and guiding thought. The recognition for which Spinoza had to wait almost two centuries has come to Mr. Spencer in the course of a single generation.

There are a great many questions raised by this article that cannot be discussed in the short space at our disposal. Whether Mr. Spencer was better or worse because he did not study Greek it is not for us to say, but there are some competent judges who think that a more thorough study of Greek philosophy would have been helpful to him. Two remarks only would we make on the character sketch, first it states emphatically that even evolutionary philosophy cannot be made popular, and second, it completely ignores all criticisms of Mr. Spencer. The writer tells us that Mr. Spencer is very much in the position of Hegel whose system could not be expressed "*ni succinctement ni en Français*," and when the general reader faces this definition of evolution he will probably be of the same opinion: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

We are informed that if we wish "to get any real good from this great life" we "must read the synthetic philosophy through, tearfully and prayerfully, many times over." And this is the encouraging prospect, to "find our whole social, moral, religious, and political world turned topsy-turvy before our very eyes, and be compelled to *think* whether we like it or lump it." All this is no doubt very interesting, but it simply comes to this that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is not for popular consumption, and that it will need to be thoroughly examined by those who think whether they are compelled or not.

There is no mention of criticism in the article, though we are told that "in the recognition of an unknown and forever unknowable Reality underlying phenomena," Mr. Spencer sees the one possible reconciliation between Science and Religion. But, in the next sentence, "dishonest or incompetent religious thinkers" are reproved for considering