side, and from which both sides will withdraw if an armistice is signed within thirty days. It was expected when this dispatch was sent to us that at a meeting which was to take place at Panmunjom at eleven o'clock Tuesday, their time, which corresponds with nine o'clock p.m. Eastern Standard Time today, the full delegations would approve the findings of the sub-delegations.

However, before a cease-fire can take effect it will be necessary for the full delegations to concur on arrangements for inspection to ensure that the truce is being observed, and to care for the exchange of prisoners of war. There is a third remaining outstanding item on "recommendations to the governments concerned on both sides", which has not yet been explored. And it is only when agreement on all three of these outstanding points has been reached that it will be possible for a cease-fire to take official effect.

The sub-delegations were to meet at eight o'clock Eastern Standard Time to complete their report for the full delegations of the two sides. The full delegations are probably in session at the present time. They were called to meet at what would correspond to nine o'clock Eastern Standard Time today; and it is assumed that they are now in conference dealing with this line of demarcation which has been set out on the plans, and with the explanatory notes.

It was expected that they would ratify this line of demarcation. The arrangement with respect to it signed on November 23 provided that when the cease-fire becomes operative, each side would withdraw two kilometers in depth from this line of demarcation, and that that would be the line of demarcation if the other items were agreed upon within thirty days from the ratification of the line of demarcation.

If they did not agree within thirty days they would nevertheless continue their negotiation of these other points; and when they had arrived at agreement upon them, the sub-delegations would revise the line of demarcation in conformity with what might then be the point of contact between the opposing forces.

On November 30, the Prime Minister replied as follows to a question by Mr. Graydon (PC, Peel) concerning cease-fire orders alleged to have been issued in Korea:

I am not sure that the statement I have here will clear up the confusion but I have from our embassy in Washington the text of the statement mads by General Van Fleet of the United States 8th Army Headquarters about the matter. It is in the following terms:

An incomplete digest of military directive has led to unfounded speculation regarding a cease-fire in Korea. Eighth Army Headquarters released a statement 28 November, 1951, wherein it was explicitly stated there is no cease-fire order in Korea. I don't know how I can be more emphatic on this matter than by reiterating this statement. Amplifying the original statement, I can say that certain military instructions were disseminated from this headquarters to corps and division levels. War correspondents' reports indicate that when these instructions were passed down to some lower command elements there was a distortion of meaning in the text of these instructions. Action is being taken to clarify these instructions for those officers and enlisted men who misinterpreted the directive. I am not at liberty to disclose the contents of the instructions which are related to future operations of the 8th army. I can definitely say, however, there is no mention made in the text ordering a cease-fire in Korea.

James A. Van Fleet, General, U.S.A.

Po River Flood

Asked, on November 26, by Mr. Catherwood (PC, Haldimand) whether the Government had received an appeal from the Italian Government for assistance in connection with the Po River flood and whether, if so, it was intended to respond to this appeal, Mr. St. Laurent stated:

The short answer to both questions is no, but I do not think I should leave it at that. I think that I should inform the House that the Secretary of State for External

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