

serious charges against the North Korean Government and against those governments in Moscow and Peking which stood behind it, is that they were willing to run this enormous risk not only for themselves, but for the whole world.

Ever since the attack on the Republic of Korea, we have believed that the efforts of those who supported United Nations action should be directed solely towards defeating the aggression, and thereby halting the chain reaction which might have followed its success. The men who decide the policies of the Soviet Union and of their communist satellites could gamble with the future of the world in order to extend the boundaries of the system under their control. We were not prepared to gamble in that reckless way. Conscious of our share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and freedom, and indeed for the preservation of human kind from the mass destruction which modern weapons make possible, we believed, and continue to believe, that we should not try to do more, in defeating this aggression, than restore the freedom and unity of Korea. The brave and strong leader in the United Nations effort is the United States. I am sure that our neighbour, in spite of provocation and notwithstanding Chinese Communist charges to the contrary, has had no thought of using the Korean situation to strengthen or expand its position in Asia or to menace any other state. If that had been its policy, United Nations action in Korea would not have received the support of 52 of its member states, including Canada.

It was obvious that, if this peace-restoring policy of the United Nations were to be achieved, the first step must be to defeat the aggressor, while respecting the legitimate fears and interests of Korea's neighbours. But this attack which showed that the communist war lords were willing to use military force to achieve their purposes, also exposed the military weakness of the free democracies and the absence of any effective arrangements under the United Nations by which such strength as they had could be mobilized quickly.

Therefore, if we were to be in a position to meet new attacks in other parts of the world, our defensive strength had to be increased, and we had to work out more effective arrangements under the United Nations by which that strength could be used collectively. We have made progress towards both these ends.

Meanwhile, the United Nations forces in Korea, under General MacArthur, were winning notable successes. After the landing at Inchon and the defeat of the invaders in South Korea, however, our efforts to restore stability entered a new phase. What we had now to solve was more than a military problem. We had to determine in what way, and at what point we would attempt to re-establish the political position in the Korean area. On a problem of that kind there could easily and properly be a number of different opinions. I do not intend to examine the various opinions which were put forward, except to say that in all the discussions of this problem which have taken place at Lake Success, in Washington, in London and elsewhere, we have consistently urged that moderation and a sense of global strategy, both military and political, should be our guide in deciding at what point military operations should be broken off and the work of pacification and reconstruction begun. We still believe that that is the proper rule to follow.

It is now clear that in a further reckless act the Chinese Communists have intervened in Korea in very large numbers. Their final purpose is not yet beyond doubt, but certainly they have committed themselves to an incursion far in excess of any that might be explained by nervousness over local Chinese interests along the border between Manchuria and Korea. In this dangerous situation, it remains our view that if and when the military position is stabilized, we should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists by every means possible. I am aware of the difficulties, I assure you, but I believe that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. If, for example, providing the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire