

Does Canada really believe that West Germany is restrained from military adventures or from acquiring nuclear weapons simply because of the presence of NATO troops in Germany? Certainly West Germany puts no more faith in America's willingness to defend her by nuclear retaliation against Russia than does De Gaulle. And as far as conventional defence against a conventional cross-border aggression is concerned West Germany is certainly capable of assembling sufficient force against any assault that was of less size than that which would invite total (and therefore nuclear) conflagration in Europe. Were Canada to disengage herself from NATO, in the opinion of many observers, including at least one who is high in the present government, some other NATO members would probably follow suit. The fear is that all that would be left would be West Germany and the United States. Yet this is the essential relationship in NATO in any event. If Canada were to declare for non-alignment, and the result was a virtual disbanding of NATO, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that she would be decreasing rather than increasing tensions in Europe. Certainly such a development would rob Russia of much of the rationale for maintaining the Warsaw Pact system. And, beyond doubt, the options open to Canada in her relationship to central and eastern Europe would be sharply increased. She might even lapse into realism by recognizing the permanent division of the Germanies.

The opportunities for constructive and peace-promoting initiatives that non-alignment would open up are, in fact, so numerous that the real question is not "should we get out?" but "why do we stay in?" The question should really be debated on exactly the same grounds as the question "should we join OAS?" If the debate were put on this basis the answer would probably be the same in both cases—the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. And in both cases the disadvantages (although even stronger in the case of NATO) cluster around the inhibitions imposed by membership. I think the inhibitions imposed by our military alignment are so numerous and, often, so subtle that they deserve further specific illustrations. For, in fact, they constitute a positive argument for non-alignment.

Canada has on many occasions expressed sympathy for the plight of the Vietnamese nation but we have sent aid only to the southern part of that nation. As a result we were listed by General Westmoreland as one of America's supporting allies—and how else but in that light can other states see us? The point is that even in an area where we have no direct treaty obligations to support American aggression we consider that our basic military alignment dictates such support. And when, after more than two full years of massive escalation of the war, Canadian public opinion showed a growing uneasiness, we got a clear statement of why we had to play ball. The statement came in a letter from former Prime Minister Pearson. It was his

reply to 360 professors who had sought Canada's open repudiation of the intervention in Vietnam and a halt to the export of Canadian war material destined for use in Vietnam. Mr. Pearson wrote: (March, 1967)

Confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than public ones.... Too many public declarations and disclosures run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned.... The more complex and dangerous the problem, the greater is the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy.

Well, the quiet diplomacy presumably continued through 1967 and 1968 with no noticeable effect—except, perhaps, to weaken the position of Mr. Ronning. What did lead to some progress towards a negotiated peace was the political breakdown in the United States itself. Can anyone deny that Canada's only real avenue of influence in these circumstances would have been along the lines proposed in the professors' letter—a kind of action that certainly would not have delayed the American political crisis and which would probably have hastened it?

While our quiet and ineffectual briefs were being trundled along the corridors of power in Washington a more effective section of our external relations machinery was in top form. The Canadian Commercial Corporation pushed ever higher our share in the profits of the war—up towards \$400,000,000 a year in *direct* contracting. And here we find the really solid reason for not rocking the North American boat. It is a reason which was elaborated in Mr. Pearson's letter. After reviewing the extent to which defence production has been integrated, and the technological and mass production advantages we receive as a result, he argued that because of these developments we could not in fact refuse to contribute to the American war effort in Vietnam:

For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is clear that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the USA, and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreements, would have far-reaching consequences which no Canadian government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance.

Perhaps this is the line of reasoning which has induced the defence minister to propose, during the present policy review, that our arms spending should be increased rather than decreased. No more concise or authoritative statement has yet appeared than that contained in Mr. Pearson's letter. After it, who can maintain that acceptance of continental integration in defence production and planning leaves us free in general foreign policy; and who can deny that our NATO-NORAD membership dictates our foreign