Together the analysis in these studies points towards four general recommendations for efforts to advance the NACD agenda in different regions. The first is that *the potential for progress is enhanced when one finds "points of resonance" or indigenous cultural expressions or experiences on which to build policy initiatives.* Proposals that situate policy departures within a traditional practice or understanding that all states within a region share enjoy a greater chance of success than those that are appear to be attempts to "import" (or "impose") an alien Western experience.

A second conclusion is that *security-building processes ought to be made as multilateral as possible,* while usually remaining within a regional context. Moving from bilateral to regional processes can minimize the ability of states to magnify differences that exist among them, can help catalyze the development of a shared regional diplomatic/security culture (ie: arms control experts, etc.), and can bring a larger set of interests (economic, civil society) to bear on a security-building process. Moving from the global to the regional level mutes the "inter-civilizational" and North-South rhetoric that has crippled many global forums, and allows regional participants to focus on their security concerns without feeling forced to deal with an imposed agenda.

A third conclusion is that policy-makers should *seek out regional entrepreneurial leaders* as linchpins for efforts to break out of established relationships and patterns and to move forward on a concrete security-building agenda. Entrepreneurial leaders are those individuals who understand that cultural factors shape decision-makers' perceptions of a situation and limit their freedom of action, while at the same time these factors can also be used by creative leaders to justify or explain new policy departures.

A final recommendation is that policies should *encourage a normative transformation in domestic politics and policies,* via a two-pronged strategy. The first element is promotion of a transnational policy community whose interaction can crystallize and shape agreement around various norms (thus making possible policy changes); the second element is a direct engagement with domestic "forces of change," such as non-governmental or civic groups within society, military establishments, alternative political formations, religious elites, and so forth. The former aims at strengthening the shared "diplomatic culture" of security-building norms; the latter, because it reaches into society, requires a great deal of cultural awareness to overcome the cultural "baggage" that is brought to these issues by domestic political actors.

Overall, well-framed policy initiatives will not rest upon crude assessments of the alleged "real interests" or "bottom lines" of particular states and parties, but will attempt to see how these are arrived at, and how interests and bottom lines are embedded in a broader socio-cultural context that can be used to facilitate (or impede) progress.

All of these case studies demonstrate that cultural factors make a difference in the articulation of national interests and the formulation of policies towards non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Although the influence of cultural elements is often elusive, there is little doubt that they can (and will) exercise a powerful influence on the prospects for security-building in various states and regions. Nevertheless, analysts are far from having a coherent framework that links positions on NACD issues with particular diplomatic, historical, strategic or political cultural orientations. Further research on security cultures could thus concentrate on the following issues:

> • tracing different cultural influences on the development (and implementation) of global NACD norms in areas such as transparency, verification or confidence-building;