World Space Organization is on both control and development, it will need other institutional arrangements to be able to cope with its development functions.

In performing their functions, both the Seabed Authority and the World Space Organization will have to deal with (a) member states; (b) inter-governmental organizations; (c) non-governmental, often multinational entities such as consortia or multinational companies. Thus, they straddle the spheres of private and public international law. Both, therefore, must combine features of a political international organization and of an operational business; both must have decision-making structures large enough to be representative and 'participatory,' yet small enough to be efficient. They must have an operational arm or Enterprise system, as well as the power to tax and to generate an income independent from membership contributions.

As noted above, there are some basic flaws in the design for the International Seabed Authority which should be avoided in the negotiations for the World Space Organization. One is the overburdening with details with built-in obsolescence; the other is a structure which sets established industry and the international organization on a course of competition and conflict rather than harmonization and cooperation.

To avoid overburdening with details, negotiations should aim at a framework treaty leaving the decision-making organs of the organization sufficient discretionary powers to adapt to changing circumstances.

To meet the second challenge the international community will have to come up with an alternative to the 'parallel system.' There are three possible precedents which should be studied. One comes from Space Law itself: the INMARSAT Convention. (INMARSAT, the international maritime satellite organization, is the marine counterpart to INTELSAT.) The second is the current experience of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission. The third is the emergence of new cooperative systems for organizing and financing high technology research and development, as exemplified by the Eureka projects in Western Europe.

The World Space Organization will have to deal with exactly the same entities — states, inter-governmental organizations, and the space industry — as INMARSAT, which distinguishes between 'States Parties' and 'Signatories.' A Signatory is an entity or enterprise, public or private, existing or to be established for the purpose, designated by a State Party to operate within the framework of the Convention. The State Party provides guidance and instructions to its Signatory, but is not normally liable for financial obligations assumed by the Signatory. The INMARSAT Convention provides for an organization consisting of an Assembly, a Council, and a Directorate. The Assembly, which is the policy-making or 'legislative' organ, is composed of representatives of States Parties, each having one vote. The Council, which is the executive and operational arm of the organization, is composed of Signatories in a way which takes account of just geographical representation.

The World Space Organization will have far broader functions and responsibilities than INMARSAT, including those dealing with international security. One might suggest, therefore, that political questions be dealt with by a political body, whereas technical and economic matters be dealt with by an operational arm, or Enterprise, as was done in the case of the Seabed Authority, albeit not entirely successfully.

For the World Space Organization one might suggest a model taking elements from both the Seabed Authority and INMARSAT. For instance, there might be a Council of 36 Members, as in the Seabed Authority, but they might simply be elected on the basis of regional representation. The Council will be responsible for a wide range of functions, including those related to international security.

The operative arm of the World Space Organization, which is a technical enterprise in which the aerospace industries will make investments, might be composed, not of international civil servants, but of 'Signatories,' and they should be represented in proportion to their investment shares. There might be established, furthermore, not one giant enterprise but a series of decentralized enterprises or 'projects.' Each one might be directed by a board composed of members half of which would be signatories who made the largest contribution to the project or enterprise, while the other half might be elected by the Assembly in such a way as to ensure fair regional representation and full participation by developing countries. The investments would be divided along similar lines.

Under the Eureka scheme, projects adopted by the Conference of Ministers are financed half by the industrial enterprises that made the proposal and half by the governments of participating states and by the European Economic Community (EEC), in those projects in which it participates. Resulting technologies are accessible to all member states and participating industries.

Adapting this model to the requirements of the World Space Organization, industrial space enterprises would submit joint project proposals to the signatory designated by their Government, who would make the selection, which would then be discussed and refined by the meeting of all signatories and, finally, through them, submitted to the Council of the World Space Organization where the project would be finally adopted or rejected. Projects adopted would be financed half by the industrial enterprises that made the proposal and the governments of participating states, and half by the World Space Organization or, through it, by public international funding agencies.