

ground-force personnel that any indigenous participant could deploy after a multilateral reduction had been negotiated. The NATO position has been steadfastly opposed to any national subceilings, arguing instead for so-called "comprehensive" limits. Not only would such sub-limits constitute an extreme intrusion into sovereign matters, but also they would preclude other states from compensating for unilateral reductions by alliance partners. The point of national sub-ceilings is to constrain the possible growth of the *Bundeswehr*, a perpetual goal of Soviet foreign policy.

Former Ambassador Dean (of the United States) makes an important point about the difficulties confronting the MBFR negotiations when he identifies the absence of political will as a key problem. He suggests that Western political interest has been intermittent at best and that the necessary impetus for making important political (as opposed to technical) decisions has been lacking.¹⁷ Without sustained attention and a basic commitment at very senior levels to negotiate a breakthrough (probably on the "numbers problem"), the MBFR negotiations are likely to languish. Although he does not say so, the criticism seems directed at the United States. Most of the participants, however, have been guilty of this, probably because they no longer see a MBFR-type reduction addressing their major security concerns. In a related vein, the advent of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe has probably undercut the already tepid interest in concluding a meagre MBFR force reduction.

Associated Measures

A central feature of NATO MBFR proposals – particularly those of 1979 and later – has been the use of Associated Measures to assist in verifying compliance and to minimize the opportunities for and concerns about a Warsaw Treaty Organization surprise attack. Verification in particular has proven to be a very difficult but nevertheless crucial issue (witness the

prolonged impasse resulting from the inability to establish even common baseline figures). Lothar Ruehl makes the point very well when he says:

Only verifiable reductions of identifiable contingents from known forces of known strength and size can constitute arms control and be an additional factor for stability.¹⁸

The 1979 NATO MBFR proposal outlined a series of rigorous undertakings designed to ensure compliance and reduce concerns about surprise attack. They included a number of what John Keliher calls "inspection measures" as well as several Helsinki style CBMs. These associated Measures included:

1. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada must give prior notification of the movement of their ground forces into the area of reductions;
2. All participants must give prior notification of any "out-of-garrison" activities (manoeuvres, movements and exercises) within the reduction zone;
3. Ground-force units (and their equipment) must enter and leave the area of reductions only through designated entry and exit points. These would be located at a fixed number of sea ports, railroad border crossings, highway border crossings, and airfields;
4. Each side will have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry/exit points;
5. Each side will have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspection trips in the area of reduction belonging to the other side;
6. There would be periodic exchange of data and information on the forces in the area after the treaty becomes effective;
7. The non-interference with the National Technical Means provision found in SALT would also be followed in MBFR;
8. A Standing Consultative Commission, similar to that found in SALT, would oversee compliance with the treaty.¹⁹

¹⁷ Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 128.

¹⁸ Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, p. 26.

¹⁹ John Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions*, p. 135, and Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, p. 26.

