

thirteen well-protected fortress guns: it was within effective range of rifle-fire. Nevertheless, on the evening before the thirteenth of April, Captain Oldershaw was ordered on that day "to work the battery to extremity."

The successive captures of the works, which Todleben ought never to have been allowed to complete, represented, with the bombardments, the chief incidents of the siege up to the moment when the time came for what was intended to be a general assault on the eighteenth of June. Mr. Kinglake has shown clearly that, on that unhappy day, the first great cause of the disaster arose from a sudden and wilful resolution of Pélissier to attack with his infantry without any immediately preceding artillery-bombardment. A very heavy bombardment had occupied the preceding days; but long experience had shown that Todleben, when not hampered by artillery-fire continued up to the moment of assault, could, during the night, so completely restore his works as to make assault hopeless. An agreement with Lord Raglan bound Pélissier to carry out the principle of a heavy bombardment on the morning of the eighteenth, directly preliminary to the assault. Nevertheless, for some reason which does not seem to have been clearly ascertained, he made up his mind to launch his infantry to the attack during the early dawn without waiting for the artillery. Confusion worse confounded of all kinds attended the several French attacks: Lord Raglan felt himself bound in honour, despite his better judgment, to send our infantry to their support, and the attempt upon the Redan, hopeless from the first, ended, like all the French attacks, in utter discomfiture.

There seems very little doubt that the failure hastened Lord Raglan's death, which followed it very closely. The end of his career thus recorded makes this the best moment to consider what Mr. Kinglake has established as to his general responsibility in relation to the campaign.

In the first place, it seems clear enough that had Lord Raglan been in command of a single army, able to utilize the force of the expedition as a whole, the allies would have marched straight from the battle of the Alma upon Sebastopol. They were in fact prevented from doing so by the illness of Marshal St. Arnaud, not even by a conflict of judgment between the two leaders. St. Arnaud felt himself unequal personally for the task that would have been laid upon him. He did not wish to resign a command for which he felt himself unfit. Therefore, and therefore only, he refused to undertake what was the obviously right course for the allies. Had they then marched on Sebastopol, it is abundantly clear, on the evidence of Todleben and on other Russian evidence, that Sebastopol would most certainly have fallen at once. No one within Sebastopol then thought it possible to defend it.

Again, when the flank march from the north to the south side of Sebastopol had been accomplished, it appears to be at least reasonably clear that Lord Raglan would have wished to attack the place on that side at once, without waiting for the long process of disembarking the siege-train and preparing the batteries for it, which, surrendering to the Russians three precious weeks, enabled them to so improve their defences of the places in men and material that afterwards the strangest siege in history became inevitable. In this case also it is clear, again on the evidence of Todleben and on other unanswerable Russian evidence, that the place must have fallen. No one within the town believed resistance to be possible.

Had either of these events taken place, that language which Mr. Kinglake quotes from the *Times* as having been delivered to the world on the reception of the false rumour of the fall of Sebastopol immediately consequent upon the Alma, would hardly have even now seemed extravagant. It would have almost appeared as "the most splendid achievement of modern warfare—an exploit alike unequalled in magnitude, in rapidity, and in its results." That instead of this there followed the long, slow siege was, as Mr. Kinglake has now conclusively shown, due, first, to the depression produced on Canrobert by the explosion in the French lines during the first bombardment, which prevented an immediate assault at a time when Todleben has declared that he could not have resisted it; and, secondly, to the long intrigue represented by the presence of Niel with the French army.

The more this story as a whole is studied, and its mere casual impressions swept away, the more clear, I believe, will it become that the story of Sebastopol does not justify those conclusions which have in fact been drawn from it, and have produced a most unfortunate effect upon English politicians.

That for the time being the command of the French army was in the hands of men not selected because of their military capacity, but because of their connection with the *coup d'état*, is at least clear enough. That in any case, an army not commanded by a single man, but confused in its leading by conflicting counsels, is utterly unfit for prompt decision and rapid execution, is not a new lesson of war. The real lesson is to be found in the enormous power that might have been and would have been exerted under the command of a single able chief by such an army, sixty thousand strong, assailed in the Crimea, supported by a fleet which held the command at sea.

In order that the amphibious power, which England can, if she will, apply with such cogent effect to the mightiest empires, may be effective, it must be in a condition to strike rapidly. The army that is required to act for such a purpose must be complete in all its parts, an army ready to take the field and move for action. The whole power is lost if long delays supervene; for the power lies in rapidity of movement, in gaining time. Let in any circumstances that time be thrown away, and all is lost.

Into the causes which tend to prevent England from so exercising her power, Mr. Kinglake has supplied us with an exhaustive inquiry. His

volume on the "winter troubles," the seventh of the series, comprises almost all that can well be said on that subject: there are, however, others on which I must touch as being specially important at the present moment. One is the story of Inkerman, and the evidence which Mr. Kinglake supplies that the Russians had at the time of it to the best of their ability adopted, and endeavoured to adopt, the very form of action employed afterwards by the Prussians in 1866 and in 1870, that of the "company column." This is so curious an illustration how little forms serve to assist soldiers, when not adapted to national characteristics and to trained habit, that it should not be ignored at a moment when we may before long again see Russian soldiers at war. In the same fight the marvellous success of the skirmishing mode of fighting instinctively employed by our own men shows, in Mr. Kinglake's graphic details; how easily our soldiers may adapt themselves to such conditions. If I have not misunderstood what one very careful student of the Russian army appears to consider the great change wrought in it by modern times, a little study of the details of that battle may be commended to him before he condemns English officers for looking upon it, rather than upon the days of Frederick and Napoleon, as indicating the present fighting-power of the Russian infantry.

Mr. Kinglake's vindication of the loyalty of Austria during all the transactions of this period, is a correction of ancient prejudices so important that it ought earnestly to be pressed upon the attention of all who concern themselves with the politics of the present hour.

Lastly, there are words which occur in Mr. Kinglake's second volume as a deduction from the result of the fight at Giurgevo, of which he makes the Czar say, "Heaven lays upon me more than I can bear," because there, half-a-dozen English officers led Turks in the open field to victory over Russians, with which I shall close this study of his work. I think he will not object to their selection as summarizing one of its most important deductions. "Therefore whenever it is possible, a British force serving abroad and engaged in an arduous campaign, ought to have on its side, not mere allies—for that is but a doubtful and often a poor support to have to lean upon—but auxiliaries obeying the English commander, and capable of being trusted with a large share of the duties required from an army in the field. Nor is this an advantage which commonly lies out of our reach; for in most of the countries of the Old World the cost of labour is much lower than in England; and it is one of the prerogatives of the English, as indeed of all conquering nations, to be able to lead other races of men and to impart to them its warlike fire. By beginning its preparations at the right time, and by bringing under the order of some of our Indian officers a fitting number of the brave men who came flocking to the war from every province of the Ottoman Empire, our Government might have enabled their general to take the field with an army of great strength—with an army more fit for warlike enterprises than two armies, French and English, instructed to work side by side and baffled by divided command."—*Frederick Maurice, in Macmillan's Magazine.*

THE WRITINGS OF WYCLIF.

It is probably known to many readers of THE WEEK that an effort is being made, for the first time, to print the whole writings of John Wyclif, the "Day Star of the Reformation." The University of Oxford, with characteristic generosity, led the way, and gave to the public three volumes of Wyclif's English writings, and also the *Triologus* under the able editorship of Dr. Lechler, perhaps the most eminent Wycliffian scholar of our times. The Early English Text Society put forth one other volume of the English Writings; and then it was felt that an appeal should be made to those who felt a more special interest in such subjects, and accordingly a Wyclif Society was formed, five or six years ago, for the publication of the remaining works, some of them of very deep interest, preserved chiefly in the libraries of Austria and Bohemia.

Already eight volumes have been published, comprising sermons and controversial treatises, and the work is being carried forward, the editing in many cases being done out of a pure enthusiasm for the cause of theological literature and Church History. The work however is, of necessity, a laborious and an expensive one; and unfortunately the number of people who care whether Wyclif's writings are published or not, is not very large. It becomes the more necessary, therefore, that the actual state of the case should be made known, and that the public generally should be made to understand that there is some danger of the scheme never being brought to completion. Mr. Standerwick, of the General Post Office, London, the Secretary of the Society, has just issued a fresh appeal, a portion of which we commend to the notice of our readers:

"The work contemplated is heavy, and the support which the Committee of the Society have hitherto received is not so great as to admit of that work being done as well or as expeditiously as could be wished. I may be allowed to point out that to keep interest alive the period over which the issues of the Society are being presented to the public should be short, and not only so but—who knoweth what a day may bring forth—fire, or the closing of an important library might at any moment prevent the Society from presenting to the public some portion or other of these priceless treasures. Besides, every member added to the Society represents an additional number of pages per issue as the average return for every guinea, and consequently that very abbreviation of time which we have so much at heart. By all considerations therefore—patriotic, literary, practical, and selfish—I would urge you to try to obtain at least one more member for our Society. The subject has been brought under every one's notice—now is the time!"