

if not the only positions from which an invasion of England can be undertaken with any chance of success, certainly those from which an attack would be most dangerous; while they have not formed a similar opinion in regard to Canada and the St. Lawrence. Besides this, when the guarantee was accepted, it seemed to be the only means of averting unpleasant European complications, which fact, doubtless, weighed in its favour. And again, if England should decide that annexation must at any cost be prevented, she can attain this end much more easily under the terms of the present alliance than under those of the proposed guarantee. England now complains, or at least Emancipationists complain, that the connection with her Colonies subjects her to dangers, responsibilities, and burdens for which she receives an inadequate return, and from which she would be freed by the dissolution of the tie. While arguing in this manner, she still holds the keys of peace and war in her own hands exclusively; the Colonies are bound to follow her into war, and are now strong enough to afford her assistance in the strife, as Canada offered to do during the Russian war. But were the guarantee system substituted, the ex-Colonies could, by their prerogative of declaring war, involve her in a strife, and by that of concluding peace, desert her in the midst of it, if so inclined, whilst they would not, as at present, be forced to follow her into war. Indeed the latter fact seems to be held up prominently in favour of the guarantee system. Then again, England's chief gain, from the connection under present circumstances, is found in her trade with the Colonies. But under the guarantee system, the tendency towards a Protectionist policy of which she now complains, would be increased by the need of larger revenues, and the exclusive devotion to local interests, which it would cause in the Colonies. Finally, England now exercises a considerable amount of moral influence over the colonists, by the name of their common Sovereign and nationality; and a direct influence over colonial statesmen and legislatures, through the chief magistrate whom she appoints; by whom she can at any time convey her wishes, or suggest a remedy for any sin of omission or commission of which she may believe them to be guilty; and can, in the last resort, send legislators about their business and appeal direct to the people. But

standing merely as the guarantor of Colonial Independence, she would possess none of these prerogatives. Do not these facts prove that the consequence of a system of guarantees would be to increase England's risks and responsibilities, whilst diminishing her returns and securities? By way of improving her position, it is proposed to strip her of the prerogatives and privileges which now tend to lighten the weight of the burden of colonial defence, and both practically and morally to secure some return for it, and yet to leave her liable to be called on at any moment to fulfil those duties for which Emancipationists declare the above prerogatives and privileges to be an illusory compensation! Is anything more requisite to prove the scheme to be an absurdity? If England should determine to maintain Canadian or Colonial Independence, would she not prefer to do it on the present terms, which at least secure her some return, rather than on those which would leave her destitute of any?

In face of these facts there seems but little room to doubt that a guaranteed nationality is unattainable. But if this view is correct, the question again becomes narrowed. If a British alliance is essential to our independence, and if we cannot get it in the form of a guarantee, it must either remain substantially on its present footing, or assume a more intimate character. In other words, shall we remain colonies, or become members of a glorious world-wide Pan-Britannic Federation, embracing, on equal terms, fatherland and offspring within its ample folds?

The relative merits of these two forms of polity now claim our attention. These have been compared by Messrs. W. H. Fuller and A. J. Drummond, in the pamphlets whose titles are placed at the head of this article. Both of these gentlemen arrive at substantially the same conclusion, which is expressed by Mr. Fuller in these words: "How long their [the colonies'] present relationship with Great Britain will last cannot be predicted, though we feel assured that it is the most enduring tie with which they can be bound together, and the most wisely adapted for mutual profit and advantage" (p. 31). With this view of the situation I cannot agree. The truth seems to me to have been approached much more closely by Mr. George Brown, when, in an address to