

where angels fear to tread." The men who wear the uniform, Mr. Editor, are the only ones whose opinion should be asked, or taken; and the Government should pay no attention whatever to the rhapsodies of Messrs. Macdonald and Bowell, neither of whom know what they are talking about.

They both forget that the Canadian Volunteers are British militia men, and will only wear the uniform of British soldiers; that their allegiance is to the Queen, that they are subject to the Queen's regulations, and that the Queen's colour, red or green, is their only colour. And they won't be "grey backs," even if Mr. Macdonald has an interest in grey shoddy.

Suppose for a moment the Government would be silly enough to change the colour of the uniform. In that case, every officer in the Service would have a just claim of from one hundred to a hundred and fifty dollars against the country, as they are all now provided, or supposed to be provided, with the regulation uniform. Would Mr. Macdonald support the Government in placing \$60,000 in the Supplementary Estimates to recoup the officers and clothe them in grey? I doubt it. The form of the cap is, with all deference to Mr. Bowell, not an open question, at least with us—the men who wear them. The Glengarry for fatigue and ordinary drill, and a low shako with visor in front, is what is wanted. Both would cost about \$150, and as they would wear for three years, if taken into store after the annual drill, the head gear could not be counted as very expensive.

I am, Sir,

Your obed't servant,

LIEUT. COLONEL.

April 3rd, 1876.

It is very evident that our military organization has suffered materially in its morale from the mischievous interference of would be "Army Reformers," as well as from the theories of political economists.

The debate on the militia displayed in a very conclusive manner how little advantage was to be derived from the presence of officers of the force in the House of Commons, and the letter quoted shews what nonsense will be spoken in debate by men of business habits, as it is called.

This tinkering with military tailormaking is rapidly becoming fashionable with a certain class of politicians, and its most outrageous displays are prompted by those who know nothing whatever of the subject brought up for discussion. It is an apish imitation of the mania displayed by members of the British House of Commons, especially by Mr. HOLMES, whose exhibitions are as periodically looked for and laughed at as are those of Dr. KENEALLY.

Personal egotism is always characteristic of weak minds, and were it not for the fact that folly is contagious and when one donkey brays all within hearing follow suit we should not have noted this particular exhibition, as every one in this country is entitled to his own opinion, as well as the right to express it in the House of Commons or out of it.

The serious position of the aspect is the mischievous tendency of such debates, it tends to discourage the people and prevent voluntary recruitment which is the avowed

object of some of the parties who are enamoured of the "right to ballot"—in other words of a power which would be very likely used to annoy their neighbors—at all events one that no ministry dare put into any individual's hands.

Scarlet is the British uniform, par excellence, has been so from the first day she had soldiers, and if it is changed by Legislative authority we venture to predict that the only available force at the disposal of the same authority will be the "penitentiary birds" of the Dominion, who are already clothed in that delight of amateur riflemen "hadden grey," so that the would-be Military Reformer and the political economist will for once achieve a most decided triumph.

We commend this view of the case to both parties.

The utterances of such a practical soldier as H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge has proved himself to be must in all cases command the respect of every thinking man. The following remarks on Cavalry possess for us a special interest—inasmuch as the value of that arm to our force cannot be over rated—and we possess facilities for organizing and training an effective force unknown to the regular service.

In the first place our forces are local—can be trained on the ground on which they will most probably be called on to fight; secondly, the organization is far less costly; and thirdly, the question of damage to which manoeuvres in a country of permanent fences like England are liable need not be incurred at all in our case.

The organization of Cavalry corps amongst our yeomanry has not been properly encouraged; it is weighed down with the "Regular service idea," and as a consequence languishes in a country where it ought to flourish in an eminent degree.

Farmers will not spend their time going to regimental headquarters for instruction; it must be brought home to the headquarters of the troop and begin with the officers—while the annual drill should be turned into "autumn manoeuvres"—in which training in "major tactics" should be the principal feature.

Major Frank S. Russell, of the 14th Hussars, and instructor in tactics at the Royal Military College, delivered a lecture on 'Cavalry Tactics' at the Royal United Service Institution, on Friday last. The Duke of Cambridge was in the chair. The lecturer said that it was often supposed that the day for cavalry had gone by, but he found from history that whenever there was a tendency to decry cavalry military science had always fallen off. All the great military leaders of the world had taken care to develop their cavalry, and Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon owed their victories to their cavalry. Frederick the Great won fifteen out of his twenty-two pitched battles by his cavalry, and Napoleon owed many of his victories to that branch of his forces. The greatest loss Napoleon sustained in his Russian campaign was the destruction of his cavalry, for cavalry was an arm that could

not be improvised. From the fall of Napoleon to the present time cavalry had not received that attention it deserved; but in the recent Franco Prussian war the entire success of the Germans might be traced to their attention to outpost duty. In the next European war they would see a new phase of tactics, and he prophesied that a few days after the declaration of war there would be a great cavalry battle, which would practically decide the campaign by giving the victors a great advantage over their opponents. It was, therefore, more important than ever to cultivate cavalry tactics. He had had the opportunity of witnessing the manoeuvres of the Prussian cavalry on a recent occasion, and they never were formed in less than three lines. That formation, however, was not a new one, for it was one which the Duke of Wellington strongly advocated. With regard to the horses, they ought not to be put into the regiment too young, but trained first in remount depots. The German squadrons, when practising, after a charge fell out and then fell in again round their squadron leader, and this practice of confusion was very valuable. In charging the men naturally lost their places, and if they were accustomed to recover themselves on the Prussian system they would not suffer from the confusion which invariably followed a cavalry charge. The gallant lecturer then proceeded to allude to various cavalry engagements, including those at Zorndorf in 1758, at Waterloo, and at Marengo in 1800, and pointed out the enormous importance of supports. The action of a small body of cavalry was most valuable and effective in the field. He deprecated the institution of mounted riflemen, and urged the importance of training cavalry soldiers to act on foot, and providing them with the best arms of precision. Cavalry pioneers were most useful, and ought to be attached to each regiment. Cavalry soldiers could not be made in a day or a month, and untrained men on horses were absolutely dangerous, and a reserve, therefore, was very necessary.

The Duke of Cambridge said, "Gentlemen, we are much indebted to the gallant lecturer for calling our attention to this very important matter, and there is no question more deserving of our consideration. Circumstances have changed very much of late years with regard to the principles of warfare, and as regards the number of cavalry regiments in our Service, that is a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, and it will, I am afraid, in the present state of things, require a good deal of persuasion to induce the public to increase the estimates, so that we may have more cavalry. If it is thought necessary to increase our cavalry strength, it must be well understood that it is a very expensive element in our army. With regard to young horses, no one objects more than I do to backing them too early, but the only remedy is to have large amount depots. With our very small establishments we must bring horses into service early, and, much as I regret it, I think it is better to back them early and get rid of them than go to the expense of keeping them idle until they get older. The question of expense is the great difficulty. As to the question of cavalry being used in three lines, there can be no two opinions, for cavalry as well as any other arm must be well supported. The great fault of the present system is that we have extended our lines more than in prudence we ought to, for unless an extended line is well supported no doubt it is a very unfavourable formation. I have many times talked over this matter with my late friend Sir Hlope Grant, and he agreed with me.