

RUN OF LEGAL PATRONAGE—LAWYERS WIGS.

bench has been changed since the present Government came into power. Including two new Lord Chancellors in England and two in Ireland, 27 equity and common law judges have been created. The following are the appointments, distinguishing the three kingdoms:—

ENGLAND.

Bovill, Rt. Hon. Sir W....	Chief Justice of Common Pleas.
Brett, Sir W. B.	Puisne Judge of Common Pleas.
Cairns, Lord.....	Lord Justice of Appeal; now Lord Chancellor.
Chelmsford, Lord	Lord Chancellor.
Cleasby, Mr.	Baron of the Exchequer.
Giffard, Sir G. M.....	Vice-Chancellor.
Hannan, Sir J.	Puisne Judge in Queen's Bench.
Hayes, Sergeant	Puisne Judge in Queen's Bench.
Kelly, Rt. Hon. Sir F.	Chief Baron of the Exchequer.
Malins, Sir R.	Vice-Chancellor.
Phillimore, Rt. Hon. Sir R.	Judge of the Admiralty Court.
Rolt, Rt. Hon. Sir J.	Lord Justice of Appeal.
Selwyn, Rt. Hon. Sir C.	Lord Justice of Appeal.
Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir W. P.	Lord Justice of Appeal.

IRELAND.

Blackburne, Rt. Hon. F.	Lord Chancellor.
Brewster, Rt. Hon. A.	Lord Justice of Appeal; now Lord Chancellor.
Chatterton, Rt. Hon. H. E.	Vice-Chancellor.
Christian, Rt. Hon. J.	Lord Justice of Appeal.
George, Rt. Hon. J.	Puisne Judge in Queen's Bench.
Lynch, Mr.	Judge of Landed Estates Court.
Miller, Mr. S. B.	Judge of Bankruptcy Court.
Morris, Right Hon. M.	Puisne Judge of Common Pleas.
Napier, Rt. Hon. Sir J.	Lord Justice of Appeal.
Walsh, Right Hon. J.	Master of the Rolls.
Whiteside, Rt. Hon. J.	Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench.

SCOTLAND.

Inglis, Rt. Hon. J.	Lord Justice General.
Patton, Rt. Hon. G.	Lord Justice Clerk.

It will be seen that the office in which the changes have been most numerous is that of Lord Justice of Appeal. In England Lord Cairns left it for the woolsack, and Sir John Rolt, after holding the appointment only six months, was compelled to resign through ill-health. The nomination of Sir Joseph Napier to the Court of Appeal in Ireland was objected to so strongly on account of his suffering from deafness that he sent in his resignation before he had entered on the duties of his post. His successor, Mr. Brewster, held the office eight months, when he was promoted to the Chancellorship. It may be added that thirteen of the new judges were returned as members of the present Parliament, and that the offices of Attorney and Solicitor-General in England and Ireland, and of Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General in Scotland, have been filled and re-filled nineteen times. The vacant Solicitor-Generalship in England will now render a twentieth nomination necessary.

The value of the judicial offices which have been filled during the past two years varies from £2,000 to £10,000 each, and represents a sum of £145,000 a-year.—*Daily News*.

LAWYERS' WIGS.

The heat has raised the question of wigs, and with it a discussion, never yet settled in England, as to the merits or demerits of official costumes. The subject looks a small one, but it is worth arguing, for it involves in a very direct, though it may be a rather ridiculous way, a matter of some importance, namely, the end which the social reformers of the day intend to seek. Are they, to put it colloquially, going in for reality in all things, or only for equality in all things? The two ends are very different, and we do not know that the difference can be better illustrated than by this very dispute about clothes. The able judge who presides in the Divorce Court, Sir James Wilde—who, be it remarked, *en passant*, has filled Sir Cresswell Cresswell's seat in a manner which was said to be impossible, showing himself at once a consummate judge, a man of the world, and a man of principle—this week advised the Bar to lay aside their wigs during the extreme heat. They complied very gladly, and the momentary breach of etiquette was taken advantage of to decry the somewhat antiquated and inconvenient costume still worn by the members of the Bar. In India and America, it was argued, the whole absurdity has been abolished. Judges are there considered citizens, invested with certain functions for the benefit of the community, and wear, without detriment to their office, the ordinary dress of gentlemen; barristers plead in frock-coats, and wigs are only worn at masquerades. Why should not the lawyers do the same in England?—why, in fact, should not everybody dress in the same costume, and the special office be left to enforce and receive such respect as is inherent in its powers, or its merits, or even its antiquity, and not in its clothes? There is no doubt that with the advocates of equality, and indeed, more or less, with most men of democratic opinions, this matter of robes is a sort of crucial test; that they heartily dislike them as relics of feudalism or other-deceased organisation of society, and will, if they can, abolish them altogether. An active and, so to speak, powerful impression of that kind deserves study, if only that we may know on what basis of reason our prejudices rest; and this particular impression, as we have said, involves much.

Prima facie, the weight of reasoning would seem to be all against the clothes, if only because the ordinary arguments in their favour are so singularly inapt. The defence from the analogy of uniform, for instance, is an absurd one, for uniform is worn by soldiers and sailors as their weapons are worn, to increase their direct efficiency. A body of soldiers or sailors in uniform is more easily recognisable by its officers and its own members than a body without such uniform, and that power of easy recognition is a valuable and indeed an essential element of force. It is usual to say that a uniform gives a soldier pride, and helps to