on good terms with the hierarchy than in the recent avowals, altogether inconsistent with the practice of past years, that the exercise of the power of veto is dependent upon the object being within or without the power of the Legislature.

The British North America Act clearly intended the power of disallowance to be exercised, as it has hitherto been exercised by both parties, in cases where the Provincial legislation was *intra vires* of the Legislature, but, for some reason or other, contrary to the general policy, or injurious to the general interests, of the Dominion. That it was so meant to be used is clear, not only from the terms of the Act, but from the recorded opinions of leading men who took part in the framing of our constitution. Sir George Cartier had it in view in the interests of his own church and race, whose representatives would be the first to demand its exercise were those interests assailed in any of the Provinces. It suits them to stand up for the doctrine of Provincial rights when the legislation of Quebec is found fault with. They would like to have that doctrine stretched to the utmost, that they might pursue unchecked their scheme of creating or fostering a purely French Canadian nationality, and, in furtherance of that object, maintaining and extending in every possible way the influence and power of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical system. But there is no doubt that the power of disallowance would be invoked by them should their interests be affected by Provincial legislation outside of Quebec. Apart, however, from any special application, the doctrine of Provincial rights, as expounded by Mr. Mills, and as evidently favoured by Mr. Bourinot, would bring about in the confederation the same results which the doctrine of State rights brought about in the United States—results which the authors of confederation in British North America clearly foresaw and were careful to avert. The Dominion Government hold this power, as they hold all other powers, by virtue of their responsibility to Parliament, and Parliament, representing all parts of the Dominion, will see that this power is exercised only when the general interests require that it should be exercised, not for party purposes, or to gain a party triumph, but for the public good. Parliament, on the other hand, is equally bound to see that it is not put in force for any unworthy object—to thwart any Province in the reasonable use of its legitimate powers, or from caprice, or a desire to injure political opponents. And neither Government nor Parliament can rid themselves of this power or this responsibility, simply because the majority feel at any time that its due exercise will involve them in difficulty, or be injurious to the interests of a party. The risk to confederation from too hasty or too frequent use of the power of disallowance is slight as compared with the certain danger that would arise from its being set aside altogether, as it virtually would be were the extreme theory of Provincial rights to prevail, or the power to be vested altogether in a judicial rather than an executive body.

In the fourth lecture, which deals with the Provincial Governments and Legislatures, Mr. Bourinot gives a very interesting sketch of the different Provinces, their Legislatures, municipal institutions, judiciary, etc.; and, in the concluding reference to the racial and religious difficulties which lie in the path of unity and progress, he expresses the opinion, in which we may all heartily con-