

President Wilson. Just why, I have never been able to figure out, but he must be a man of very great ability. I should like to see this committee have him here so that we can question him. I should also like to see the committee have men like Cordell Hull, so that the committee could get the background of this whole thing, the reasons for Bretton Woods and the meaning of Bretton Woods, the meaning of the gold standard.

May I point out, Mr. Chairman, that we have had one witness, and that witness was selected by the government. We have had just one. While he is a splendid young man as far as I can judge, he is a young man. He must not be over 40 years of age. No matter what his educational qualifications may be, surely the Banking and Commerce Committee of the House of Commons of Canada, the Banking and Commerce Committee of the major member of the British Commonwealth, on whose decisions will in large measure depend the courage with which Britain opposes this measure, should not pin its faith entirely on one man. That would not be in accordance with the principles of common sense. So I am asking you, Mr. Chairman—and I see no way of avoiding the difficulty we are in except by asking you—to suggest to this committee that in the interests even of decorum in the conduct of this investigation we ask that our sittings be adjourned until after the holiday at least, so that we can conduct our hearing in something like an orderly and respectable manner.

May I just illustrate to you how serious is the thing we are doing, Mr. Chairman. Here are the reports of the hearings of the Banking and Commerce Committee for 1944. Just look at them. All that committee was dealing with was the Bank Act, bill 91, and probably two or three very minor matters. Now, Mr. Chairman, the Bank Act of Canada, is an Act over which we must have complete control, an Act which we can call under revision, under advisement and under scrutiny at any time we choose, an Act which must come under revision again within 10 years, and surely that Act is a document of such insignificant importance as compared with the Bretton Woods agreement as to be dwarfed into utter insignificance.

Mr. MARIER: And how much of it is useless?

Mr. BLACKMORE: That is not the question. The important matter, Mr. Chairman, is this, that during this time—

Mr. MARIER: There were two-hour speeches made there to no purpose.

Mr. BLACKMORE: What difference does that make?

Mr. MARIER: I was on the committee.

Mr. BLACKMORE: I was too.

Mr. QUELCH: Were you not partly to blame?

Mr. BLACKMORE: The important matter is the number of sittings of that committee. Notice that this 1944 committee commenced to sit in March. I have the details here, if the committee will permit me to give them.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. Blackmore, we are all pretty well familiar with them. You have made your point in that regard.

Mr. BLACKMORE: All right, Mr. Chairman. Then, look for a moment or two at the hearings of the Banking and Commerce Committee of 1934, ten years before.

Mr. FRASER: They were not as long winded.

Mr. BLACKMORE: Here is the report. It consists of 960 typewritten pages in small print, and the hearings extended over a period from March 6 until June 14, 1934. During that time the members had a chance to read the *Hansard* of the committee. They had a chance to call whatever witnesses they wished. They had a chance to reflect. Now here again all we have under consideration