

real war stride, and I think I had a right to that consolation. I honestly thought that after ten months of hesitation and delay and not grappling with the great problem of the war, Canada was really getting into its war stride. I held that belief until early in October. It will be recalled that a large number of eminent journalists from the neighbouring republic were invited to visit Canada in September last. I believe that the Canadian government was the host and that the arrangements were consummated and carried through under the auspices of the Canadian Press. In any event these gentlemen came to Canada. They were taken to see everything their conductors wanted them to see. Presumably they were told everything their conductors wanted them to hear. Certainly I have the right to assume that, and certainly I have the right to assume that they were not shown or told anything that would be detrimental to the prestige of the government. That was not the idea at all; that never was contemplated. Mr. Rupert Davies, head of the Canadian Press, would see to that. They were shown and told of the best of Canada's war effort. They went home and early in October wrote their impressions and ideas in their own way, and I judge without any censorship. This does not make pleasant reading. Frankly I was greatly disillusioned. I did not have an opportunity of studying all they reported, but some of their reports rather made my heart sick. I suppose the most outstanding military expert among them was Mr. Baldwin of the *New York Times*, a newspaper which in my view ranks as high if not higher than any other journal in the world. His report appeared in the *New York Times* of October 1, and the headlines themselves are disheartening:

War Effort Peak in Canada a Year Off.

Dominion Expected to Become Major Factor in Conflict Late in 1941.

Bottlenecks in Skilled Labour, Machine Tools and Plane Engines Revealed.

How does that jibe with what we were told in the months of July and August, when parliament was in session? Particularly how does it jibe with what Canada had been told by ministers and others after parliament had adjourned?

I am glad to think that Mr. Baldwin's comments and reflections were not all adverse; far from it. It is a great pleasure to read that he found Canada virtually united in an earnest determination to prosecute the war and to defend the western hemisphere. He paid well deserved tribute to the men of the armed forces; but his comments give no cause for the complacency exhibited to us. On the contrary, in some instances they tend to give cause for grave humility. He found

[Mr. R. B. Hanson.]

Canada "sadly lacking, not in man power but equipment," all of which we knew. He found "many shortages of equipment, as well as bottlenecks in aircraft engines, machine tools and skilled labour." Industrial production is described as "but a small drop in the huge bucket of war." But he did find that in the empire air training scheme—and I want to commend this to my hon. friends opposite and especially to the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power)—there was the most promise for effective aid to the mother country; that it would be "Canada's greatest war contribution," but that it would not produce its first class of about forty pilots until this month, November, and would not reach its peak until late in 1941, two years or more after the war started. He made this statement with regard to aircraft production.

No aircraft engines are being produced in Canada. Air frames (or planes) are being produced at the rate of about 130 a month. About 110 or 120 of these are training planes—Fleets and de Havillands; the other ten are Bristol Blenheim and Hampden bombers and Hawker Hurricane fighters. About ten planes a month—mostly training planes—are being received from the United States. Present plans call for peak production—which it is hoped will be 320 to 360 planes a month, two-thirds of them training planes—by March, 1941, a plan that is not likely to be realized.

The next extract I shall skip, for it is long and not particularly important. This writer does not attach any blame; it would not be his function to do so. He gives independent testimony on what I have always maintained and on what the former Minister of National Defence specifically denied to me across the floor of this house; that, with respect to our first and second divisions, except for motor transport, rifles, uniforms and gas masks, they were virtually equipped in England.

Mr. Baldwin praises the quality of our fighting material. He states that, because of equipment shortage, men cannot be finally and well trained, but adds that personnel is alert and eager, and mentally of a high standard. They have been thoroughly drilled in fundamentals and are particularly well schooled in concealment, field craft and protection against gas. He was not, of course, referring to the thirty day training plan.

Summing up, Mr. Baldwin states that Canada's war effort is now—as of September, 1940, a year after the war began—

—commencing to mesh into gear, though it will still be eight to twelve months before the Canadian effort becomes a major factor in the war.

So much for the opinions of our friends to the south.

Recently I read with interest an article appearing in the *London Spectator*, written