

of those Member States that have accepted the United Nations resolutions establishing the aggression, only a minority of 16 have participated in collective military action - and that participation has varied from a few hundred soldiers to the great military, naval and air effort made by the United States.

The Government of the United States - designated as the Unified Command by the Security Council and representing the country which has made by far the largest military contribution - apart from the soldiers of the Republic Of Korea - has, in fact, and because of these special circumstances, directed and controlled operations in Korea. Yet it is impossible to control military operations in modern war without making decisions that are political in their result.

Today, for instance, the truce negotiators in Panmunjom on the United Nations side are American, and their day to day - which, at times, must have more than military implications - instructions come from Washington. To take just one illustration, no representative from a nation of the British Commonwealth which has supplied troops, ships and aircraft, sits in on these discussions and no report of them can be made to any United Nations member participating in the Korean conflict, except through Washington.

I do not criticize these arrangements in the circumstances that exist and I think it would be unwise now to change the pattern that has been established. I also have good reason to know that a great deal of information is regularly given on Korean developments by the United States authorities to the representatives in Washington of those United Nations members who have forces in Korea. Nevertheless, from the point of view of international co-operation, this is obviously not the best way to carry on a genuinely collective operation by a group of freely associated states. If the reply is made that a greater military contribution by more of those states would have brought about more genuine collective control and supervision of the Korean war by the United Nations, I can only express some doubt whether this, in fact, would have occurred; at least in a way to satisfy all the states directly concerned.

I recall, for instance, that in World War II my own country had a million men and women in the armed services, and made a significant contribution to the common victory. Yet it was not a member of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff who dictated the strategy of the war, nor did it participate directly in the big political discussions which laid down the basis for that strategy.

We did not complain about this, because when national survival is at stake, efficient and centralized control of operations and policy is far more important than matters of prestige or equality.

But what is accepted in a war of survival may not be as acceptable in a United Nations collective police action or in the work of a coalition to prevent war such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In these less