

monitor events of possible interest. Nevertheless, the rules whereby overflights are undertaken in a Middle Eastern regime would have to be very precise. The experience gained in the region would seem to indicate that unauthorized excursions into the airspace of another country are treated as not merely inconveniences, but as serious threats to national security.

All of these methods would likely be used in combination to design overflight procedures which were neither too restrictive nor too intrusive. In the final analysis, the determination of appropriate procedures would rest upon political decisions as to the nature of the regime and the extent to which states of the region were willing to enter into which new security relationships.

With regard to overflight quotas, the number of such overflights would be a function of what they were meant to look for. If they were to detect signs of a large military build-up which might precede a belligerent act, overflights would need to be sufficiently frequent as to prevent undetected mobilizations of troops. The actual number of flights, in turn, would be a function of the amount of time it takes each nation to mobilize its troops for war. Overflights would have to be allowed with sufficient frequency to prevent an undetected mobilization getting to a stage at which an offensive became possible before a neighbour had time to react.

Of course, several of the states in the region have various means of detecting large mobilizations. An Open Skies regime would tend to reinforce these means and to provide those states lacking them with some warning. For those states which possess such means, an Open Skies regime would provide a mechanism for gathering information which could be made public without compromising classified information collection capabilities.

## CONCLUSION

While the specific technical problems of establishing an Open Skies regime in the region could be overcome through these and other measures, the deeper question of the place of such a regime in the region's developing security situation must be addressed. Open Skies is one of the more sophisticated and intrusive Confidence-building measures ever proposed. It took almost three years for the states of NATO and those which used to belong to Warsaw Treaty Organization to negotiate an agreement, despite the facts that they had a history of such negotiations, and that their relations were experiencing their most profound thaw in four decades. Given these facts, it would seem that Open Skies requires more than