

- (b) Issues relating to international verification measures
- (i) While delegations believed that international verification measures should include arrangements for on-site verification, their views differed on specifics of such arrangements.
 - (ii) There were differences of view as to whether or not systematic on-site inspections would be necessary to verify:
 - destruction of chemical weapons stocks;
 - destruction or dismantling of means of/facilities for production of chemical weapons as well as filling facilities;
 - production of certain chemicals for non-hostile military purposes; and
 - non-production of chemicals for prohibited purposes.
 - (iii) On the issue of conversion of facilities, some delegations held that, if conversion was allowed, systematic on-site inspection of converted facilities would be required.
 - (iv) According to one view, the establishment of an international verification agency, in addition to the consultative body, would be desirable in the system of international verification. Others did not share this view.. Still others believed that the establishment of such an agency was a broader question that transcended the framework of a chemical weapons prohibition.
 - (v) While some delegations were of the opinion that complaint procedures could involve the United Nations Security Council, others believed that the United Nations General Assembly could be a more appropriate body.

C. Other Issues

(1) Confidence-building measures

The view was expressed that international means of verification should include procedures for confidence-building measures, but the issue was not examined in detail.

(2) Negative guarantees

One view was that such guarantees should be considered in the course of the elaboration of a convention. Others held the view that the question of non-use was covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.