

While there seems to be a general sense of satisfaction with this practice, difficulties may arise with respect to the movement of samples and equipment, and with the granting of multiple- versus single-entry visas. These practices could be explored more closely. A particular question might be how practices like these would be carried out under a regime of challenge inspections or when rapid access to a location was desirable. Whether and how such procedures might be strengthened and streamlined should be examined.

### **Field Offices**

The Agency has two field offices, in Toronto and Tokyo. The development of field offices, whether they serve major clusters of safeguarded facilities in one state or in a region, helps the Agency achieve greater efficiencies in the use of personnel, since travel time to and from a central headquarters is reduced or avoided. Given the likely manpower constraints of a chemical weapons verification agency, it might benefit from a similar arrangement. The possibilities and the issues that might arise with respect to field offices should be studied.

### **The Designation of Inspectors**

Inspectors for the Agency are appointed by the Director General with the approval of the Board of Governors, but they are designated for a specific state with the approval of that state, and the designations may be withdrawn. Difficulties with the designation process may affect the efficient use of manpower, at best, and at worst may damage the credibility of the Agency's assurances.

States may be slow in responding to suggested designations, thus delaying them and potentially delaying inspections. More generally, they may reject not merely individual inspectors but, informally, whole categories of persons because of language, nationality or other reasons. Or they may use their powers to limit the number of inspectors assigned to them. Most states put constraints on designations, and one result is that some inspectors are overused and others underused or even confined to headquarters. The Agency is unable to use all its inspectors everywhere, and so cannot deploy its limited resources in the most efficient manner. In addition, while one safeguarded state may find certain inspectors acceptable, others may regard them as less than competent.

The ability of a state to reject or withdraw acceptance of an inspector may be a necessary complement to its acceptance of inspection in the first place, but the Agency's experience also points to the costs — to it and possibly to the inspected state — of such discretionary power. It might be useful to study the Agency's designation procedures and problems more closely, specifically to see if some of these problems could be reduced or avoided through a revised procedure or through other Agency policies.