

COMMON SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION

A) Arms Control and Defense Issues in a Common Security Context

There is a circular relationship between arms control and common security. The pursuit of each helps create the conditions for the successful pursuit of the other. Common security negotiations cannot go very far if either side is simultaneously trying to achieve a military superiority. At the same time, without some progress in the development of the common security institutions which provide alternatives to force in the protection of national interests, we can hardly expect states to give up much in the cause of arms control.

The pursuit of common security is not in the beginning a substitute for military deterrence. It is rather a parallel policy, *something done in addition to deterrence to gradually move the world away from the need for military deterrence altogether*. Throughout the transition to a world of reliable common security, states would continue to maintain sufficient military deterrence with the levels of armaments gradually decreasing as confidence in the central institutions of common security grew.

We believe, however, that the military forces, both conventional and nuclear, at the disposal of NATO are adequate by any rational calculation of the requirements of deterrence and defense. Our conventional forces may seem smaller, but a military fighting defensively on its home territory has advantages on that account which compensate for smaller numbers. Furthermore, in estimating the adequacy of our forces we must consider, too, the established superiority of our weaponry and the higher morale and level of training of our troops, and also that any Soviet attack on Europe would certainly bring French, and quite probably Swedish and other forces into action on NATO's side.

We therefore do not accept that the credible defense of Europe requires us to choose between a great conventional build-up or a continued reliance on the option of first-use of nuclear weapons. NATO first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe would lead to the destruction of the all we hope to defend. There is little confidence even among nuclear strategists that a nuclear exchange, once initiated, could be controlled or remain limited.

If a first-use option is unwarranted in Europe, it is the more unwarranted in other parts of the world where there is much less at stake to justify the first-use of nuclear arms. That any NATO ally, particularly the U.S., would want to reserve an option of initiating a nuclear exchange in some other part of the world is intolerable.

The resistance of the U.S. to forswearing the first-use of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities is one of the most ominous and frightening indicators that the U.S. does not regard nuclear war as so very unthinkable. While we agree that declarations in themselves do not provide much of a basis of confidence, a lack of willingness to make declarations may well provide additional reasons for lack of confidence.

Recommendation 4-1: That Canada pursue a general NATO declaration of no first-use of nuclear weapons, tied to negotiations aimed at mutually defensive deployments consistent with no first-use.