

SALT I negotiations, being dropped “only when it became clear that the United States was adamant against them.”¹²⁵

More recent Soviet proposals along these lines have not specified that SSBNs be moved back beyond the range of their missiles. For example, President Brezhnev in March 1982 proposed simply that the “missile submarines of the two sides should be removed from their present extensive combat patrol areas, that their cruises should be restricted by limits mutually agreed upon.”¹²⁶ Identical language was used in the Memorandum entitled “Averting the Growing Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race,” submitted by the Soviet Union to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) later that year.¹²⁷

In revealing the CBMs actually proposed to the United States during the START talks of that year, a *Pravda* editorial dropped any mention of the restricted SSBN patrol zones, but did specify that the Soviets had proposed “to ban the flights of heavy bombers . . . of one side in agreed zones adjoining the territory of the other side”¹²⁸ — thus retreating considerably from the earlier (and much less negotiable) proposal to confine such aircraft exclusively to their own national airspace. This new Soviet proposal, elsewhere described as a “ban on close approaches by bombers to each other’s airspace,” was later cited in American press reports as well.¹²⁹

SUBMARINE STAND-OFF ZONES

Despite the fact that proposals of this kind have been uniformly

125. Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Accidents Measures Agreement,” in: John Borawski (ed.), *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*. Boulder: Westview, 1986, p. 61.

126. “Excerpts From Remarks By Brezhnev on Missiles,” *NYT*, 17 March 1982, p. A6.

127. A/S-12/PV.12, p. 32.

128. “The USSR and the USA: Two Approaches to the Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Talks,” Supplement to *Moscow News*, No. 2, 9 January 1983, p. 6.

129. “US and Soviet Seek to Prevent a Surprise Attack,” *NYT*, 8 December 1983, p. A6; see also the article by the chief American delegate in the special working group on CBMs established at the START talks in late 1983, Michael E. Mobbs, “CBMs for Stabilizing the Strategic Nuclear Competition,” in: Borawski (ed.), *op. cit.* note 125, p. 152.