

for Soviet military control and coordination, NATO has always been an alliance of sovereign states, addressing not only military but policy issues as well, including the coordination of arms control matters. There never was symmetry between these two European defence organizations.

Of course, NATO cannot now conduct business as usual. It has to devise new ways of military integration with much reduced forces; rethink and reformulate its nuclear strategy; and give greater emphasis than it has so far to the management of arms control. And it will also have to address the question whether in a world in which military forces are much less central to international politics, other forms and fora for transatlantic cooperation need to be found.

Yet NATO will remain essentially a Western club. The idea, advanced by some, that Eastern states, too, should join, overlooks three fundamental realities: that Eastern European countries, having just regained their independence, have no desire to submit themselves to any new supranational organization; that Western countries continue to want to discuss security and defence issues among themselves; and that the Soviet Union would regard any eastward territorial extension of NATO as thoroughly unacceptable.

THEN THERE IS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF twelve Western European nations. This Common Market, which will become significantly more integrated with the internal market planned for 1992, is already exerting a major attraction on all other European countries, those of Eastern Europe included. Because of its wealth and its large market, the European Community has recently been pushed into a new kind of security role. For Eastern European economies, access to this market would offer the hope of economic recovery and hence could be highly useful in strengthening political stability in these countries. Perhaps some day, Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia might qualify for full membership. In the meantime, association agreements between the Community and East European states have to be arranged.

So the European Community indeed has a stabilizing role and hence a responsibility for security, but that does not qualify it to become a European system of security. Perhaps, as part of the reform in Western defence cooperation, the Community might increasingly offer a framework for a genuinely Western European defence integration, and there are many in Europe who feel that this would be desirable. But it is difficult to imagine that it could evolve into a wider European security forum.

Finally, there is the ongoing process of East-West arms control negotiations in Europe. The



talks in Vienna which started in March 1989 are moving ahead at a speed unheard of for such negotiations: a first agreement, setting equal ceilings of military forces for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, is probable by the autumn; a follow-up on deeper reductions is already being prepared. Of course, these talks do not amount to a formal organization. But some organizational structure is nevertheless likely to emerge in the proposed regime for verification and confidence-building measures.

SO THERE IS NO ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY system yet – or is there? Perhaps the apparent tidiness of the European security structure during the past forty years has misled us into thinking that a security system must, in order to function, be equally tidy and thoroughly organized. But remember, in the past this was the consequence of extraordinary circumstances – a threat assumed to be precise in a world assumed to be bipolar. Now that the threats have become more amorphous and the world pluralistic, a looser, less formalized and less comprehensive security system would seem to be quite appropriate. Indeed, Europe's new security system consists of the four elements outlined above, each imperfect in itself, but complementing the others.

All-European security matters can, therefore, be addressed in their political aspects in a

strengthened CSCE, in their military aspects in quasi-permanent arms control negotiations to which crisis centres and a verification regime would be added. All-European economic prosperity – and with it political stability – will be served by the European Community through its internal integration and a series of association agreements with other European states, possibly one day even including the Soviet Union. And Western political and military coordination would continue in a revamped NATO, with the European Community increasingly becoming the framework for close West European defence integration.

THE FIRST TEST OF WHETHER THIS MULTI-LAYER system can actually work will lie in the way German unification is embedded in an international consensus. Significantly, the diplomatic timetable already envisages stages which correspond to the various elements of the new European security system listed above. There will be a series of meetings between the two German states and the World War II allies (the US, the USSR, France and Britain) to seek agreement on the future alliance status of a united Germany and the expiration of still existing Four-Power rights in Germany.\*

The Vienna negotiations on arms control will have to define the size and equipment of military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, including a ceiling for future German forces (the large majority of Europeans, East and West, and of Germans want the united Germany to be a member of NATO). In late 1990, a CSCE Conference will bring together all thirty-five member states of the organization to review and settle the matter. In the meantime, the European Community will have to provide some prospect of closer association to other European states.

Of course, timetables can get tangled; things can go wrong. There are many actors who could throw spanners into the diplomatic works. Imagine for a moment that the Soviet Union might try to respond to Baltic aspirations to independence with military repression. Hence the task of getting from here to there is by no means an easy one. But if there is reason, nevertheless, for confidence that the unification of Germany can be achieved in a cooperative atmosphere, it is due to the existence today of the different elements of East-West, European and Atlantic cooperation. The layers are in place; now they have to be fitted together. □

\*In accordance with treaties signed in 1945, the four victorious powers of the Second World War – France, the UK, the US and the USSR – retain rights and responsibilities with respect to Germany. Any changes of the status quo of the three political organisms – the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Berlin – formed on the territory of Germany delineated by the Potsdam resolutions (1945) require the agreement of all four powers.