

Steffen follows, of course, with pages on Germany's need of "room for geographical, economic and political development." It is difficult to see what limit could be put to this comprehensive claim for development. Most people would think Germany had done extraordinarily well in the last thirty years. Bismarck used to declare he was quite content with less. But Professor Steffen's plea would justify Germany in seizing Brazil or Cuba to-morrow and going to war with the United States over it.

Professor Steffen has often a very simple art of presenting Germany's case. It consists in simply losing sight of certain large general facts in the case and discussing the question on other grounds. For example, everybody knows the superior numbers and immensely superior preparation with which Germany took the field and how she counted on striking France down before the slow and unwieldy forces of Russia could be fully marshalled. It turned out differently. The rush on Paris failed. Russia and even Britain had time to collect their strength. Still later Italy came in. The German program for a quick crushing blow had gone to pieces and Germany and her allies eventually found themselves facing four great Powers fully armed. This enables Professor Steffen to argue that Germany could never have been so foolish as to seek voluntarily a war with such an assemblage of forces. Here are his own words which he intends to be finely ironic: "German militarism . . . is then the most insane thing in the world inasmuch as it voluntarily prepares its certain downfall by an absolutely motiveless offensive war against almost all Europe, nay almost against all mankind (sic). And yet (they say) it chose the moment for attack which was most advantageous for itself and most disadvantageous for its poor victims." (p. 13.) It must occur to some of the professor's readers surely that Germany neither willed the war nor entered it with "all mankind" against her. When she began to march her soldiers into Belgium she counted on only two antagonists, France and Russia, and sorely was Bethmann-Hollweg disturbed when the British ambassador