

would properly be subject for more or less lengthy analysis to do it anything like justice. But the question is so fundamental that even a note or two may serve to emphasise its perpetual interest.

In the first place, a department of the government is not a dividend-paying concern. Its Head is not engaged in a struggle for existence with other similar enterprises. Hence, he may manage it on other than business principles, and yet not suffer. He may not even suffer politically by bad methods, for publicity is imperfect, and in many cases the questions involved are technical. And herein lies one of the supreme disadvantages of the great mass of his employees. They are specialists. They cannot seek other markets for their wares. The carpenter, bookkeeper, manager, in the outside world, who is dissatisfied with his employer, seeks work elsewhere, and saves his manhood under injustice. But the civil servant who has spent perhaps the best ten years of his life in the administration, say, of the Fisheries or Indian Department, or a dozen branches that might be named, is bankrupt if in middle age he finds the better positions barred to him for reasons that have nothing to do with the working of his department. A humiliated and outraged man, he sinks into the lethargy of hopelessness and lowered self-respect. There is no employer in the world so absolutely dependent upon its nameless rank and file as a government. There is no employer which can better afford to recognize its unusual debt.

Another point:

One of the weakest points in the civil service structure to-day is in the status of the Deputy Minister. We do not mean the legal status of that office—for the Department of Justice is on record, years before the findings

of the late Royal Commission, to the effect that in every respect with regard to the service, the Deputy is the equal in power of the Minister. We mean rather the conventional estimate that has come to be attached to the post, and that is now stereotyped. To all intents and purposes the Minister and his Deputy in Canada are one person. It could not have been otherwise under a system of political appointments, where the service played a role in party politics, and where a minister had of necessity a political as well as an administrative interest in the staff of his department. Yet it is very far from the principle on which a policy of civil service reform can be carried out. The supreme function of the Deputy Minister under civil service reform is to separate administration from politics. Merge him in his minister and you leave the department minus its non-political head. If a concrete example of what is meant is desired we have the case of the English service. There the minister and the officer corresponding to our Deputy Minister are distinct and several. The minister is the political head of the department; the Deputy is the administrative head. The former knows little or nothing about the personnel of his staff, which is entirely in the latter's hands, under the rigid prescriptions of the commission, and subject, of course, to the rule of the political head in matters concerning policy and duties. Such a thing as a political promotion and the acquiescence in it of the administrative head is possible, accordingly, only under the most exceptional circumstances. The reason lies in the importance of the deputy's position, arising out of its separation from the ministerial office. Proof of this again is in the distinctions which fall to the higher officers in the British service. Knighthoods are common, and not