1 C.B., at p. 840, where he says, "the maxim" (quoting it) "is not a presumption of law applicable in all cases, and under all circumstances; for example, it does not apply to chambers in the inns of court." Coltman, J., observes that for a cornice which overhangs another's property to constitute a trespass is opposed to the opinion of Lord Ellenborough. "Clearly it would be a trespass to sail over another man's land in a balloon at a level within the height of ordinary buildings, and it might be a nuisance to keep a balloon hovering over the land at a greater height:" Pollock on Contracts.

Were the standards fixed by international law in the provinces, which, at present, they regulate to affect, in the future, this department of activity, may we not hear of a dirigible, of foreign make and ownership, intending a flight in some alien state, being, as was the British vessel lying at its moorings in Rotterdam, regarded as part of the country where it lingered? Or, in that contingency, importing the rule that the authority of municipal courts does not embrace points in the sea, there may be a recrudescence of the problem which, in the famous Coombes case, a century and a half ago, taxed to the full the acumen of the whole body of justices of the King's Bench to solve, whether the killing of a man on a ship a hundred yards away, by one who fired upon him from the shore, occurred within the Admiralty, or the ordinary land, jurisdiction.

The pathway of international law, in any event, should it ever lie through such wide-ranging, unproved field—without landmarks to assist, and where anything like precise demarcation of frontiers must be impracticable—will unquestionably be a thorny one.

J. B. MACKENZIE.