

acquired property. According to Italian law the settlement was void, but according to English law it was valid. Buckley J. held that English law governed, and that though the property in question was bequeathed to the wife's separate use and subject to a restraint against anticipation, yet it being a reversionary interest, the restraint ceased on its falling into possession and it was bound by the covenant to settle.

SOLICITOR—CHARGING ORDER—LIEN FOR COSTS—MONEY IN COURT AND IN HANDS OF RECEIVER—"PROPERTY RECOVERED OR PRESERVED"—SOLICITORS ACT 1860 (23 & 24 VICT. C. 127) S. 28—(ONT. RULE 1129).

Ridd v. Thorne (1902) 2 Ch. 344, was an action for dissolution of a partnership. The plaintiff had obtained the appointment of a receiver who had received the assets of the firm, part of which was paid into court and another part still remained in his hands. Certain creditors of the firm had obtained charging orders against the assets which should come to the hands of the receiver, they undertaking to deal with the charge thus created according to the order of the court. The solicitor of the plaintiff in the action now claimed a lien on the assets recovered in the action for his costs and claimed a charging order therefor on the assets, under the Solicitors Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 127) s. 28 (Ont. Rule 1129) as being "property recovered or preserved" within the meaning of that section. Joyce J. held that he was so entitled, and that his charge was entitled to priority over the charging orders obtained by the creditors.

COMPANY—CORPORATE NAME—TRADE NAME—INJUNCTION.

In *Randall v. The British American Shoe Co.* (1902) 2 Ch. 354 the plaintiffs were a joint stock company incorporated by the name of "Randall Limited" and had for the purposes of their trade also adopted and used in addition to this corporate name, the name of "The American Shoe Company." Eady J. held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from using the name of "The London American Shoe Company" or "The British American Shoe Company" and that the fact that the plaintiffs had not always complied with the provisions of the Companies Act requiring them to have their corporate name outside their places of business did not disentitle them to relief.