

meaning and purpose become rapidly misconceived. But the admission that the empirical study of mind must settle undisturbed its own problems in its own way, by no means implies that there are not other problems which it cannot settle at all, and which if it attempts to settle them will waste its energies and unfit it for its proper task.

The true principle of separation then between psychology and metaphysics, the only principle which is really serviceable, seems to lie in distinguishing, not the material studied, but the standpoint and purpose of the study.

In material they constantly overlap; but their ways of regarding the material are so radically different that a statement may be right if looked upon as a piece of psychologizing, and wrong if looked upon as a piece of metaphysics. To Mr. Prichard this seems a perfect paradox, and later in this paper I shall consider at length how much force his objections contain. Meanwhile, let me offer an illustration from another science which seems to me analogous. Much recent research in physics has been directed towards the discovery of the ultimate constitution of the atom. The question clearly does not admit of direct investigation: atoms cannot be isolated and examined. What can be done is to frame a tentative hypothesis, and proceed to test it by inquiring whether it explains those assumed properties of the atom which in turn seem themselves to explain the physical properties of bodies. Consequently, the whole treatment must be highly speculative and open to many kinds of error. Forty-five years ago Lord Kelvin propounded the Vortex Theory which by its boldness and originality attracted much attention; but it was quickly seen that while