that one superbly equipped division is worth three or four, or even more, which are inadequately equipped. Let us not forget the military factors which contributed to the collapse of France. I made the same point to the House on December 2nd of last. Time has not diminished the force of my words.

I said on that occasion,

"Let me give an illustration," the force of which will be immediately recognized. Had we been guided by vociferous demands that were made at the outset, we would have concentrated our effort, our wealth and our strength on recruiting large numbers of men for service in the army overseas, rushing them across the ocean, with conscription as probably the only method of meintaining large supernumerary armies in the field. That might have served to meet a certain clamour of the hour, but, in the long run, it would have made for disunity in Canada, and in meeting Britain's need, proven to be, in large part, wanton weste. Instead of elding Great Britain, as we are doing today, with our forces in the air and at sea, with munitions, with ships and with other equipment, material and supplies in ever-increasing measure, we would have placed upon a beleaguered island the added burden of feeding numbers of men not required at the present time.

"We did not yield to the clamour. The government, instead, laid its plans for a balanced development of all branches. We built up an air force and a navy, as well as an army. We developed war industries, and we conserved exchange for the use of Britain and ourselves. While planning for the battles oversees, we have also been mindful of our own shores, and the dangers with which they may at any moment be beset as the scenes of conflict change and war's terrors become intensified. This type of planning does not lend itself to display. But it brings real results in the end. As it is inevitable that the war will be long, it is equally inevitable that the results of a sustained effort can be realized only with the passage of time."

submarined

Raue