

large projects of reform, long overdue, which have had to wait for the constitution of an assembly that has a chance of bringing them into being. And this task will involve a grave infraction of their ordinary duties. The difficulty might indeed be met by the increase of the judiciary, and by the constitution of a special section which could devote itself mainly to the legislative part of the work, and would form a kind of Conseil d'État. But if there is to be a special legislative body, then it would seem preferable to separate it more thoroughly from the judiciary. This was the design of Lord Cromer, who in his report in 1906, sketched the formation of a local organization participating in the making of laws applicable to Europeans. This body was to be composed of subjects or protégés of the Treaty Powers, not exceeding twenty-five or thirty in number, of whom the majority would be elected members, and a certain proportion representatives of the Egyptian Government, i.e., European officers in the Egyptian service. The mode of election suggested was the representation of local interests, based either on landed property or commerce, rather than a representation of nationalities or communities. M. Vercaemer criticizes Lord Cromer's proposal with considerable effect. The elected members, he argues, might have considerable knowledge of purely economic questions: they would be incompetent to deliberate on questions of general law or to fashion the legislation to growing needs. And the non-elected members would be an unacceptable introduction of English (official) influence into a sphere where foreign powers are peculiarly jealous of their privileges. He himself favours the creation of a special law-making body (a Council of Legislation) which should consist of distinguished jurists chosen either in Egypt or Europe, but without regard to their nationality, and which should be smaller than Lord Cromer's proposed assembly. It would have the power of consulting with the ministers of the Egyptian Government, and also with the judiciary of the mixed courts, as M. Vercaemer proposes that the latter body should have a right of suspensive veto over any legislative act, in place of the