

ful believes, will lay open and expose to his tactics, *the very soul of the State*; namely, the financial sources of the nation.

Buonaparte's opinion on the finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect :

1. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made peace.

2. That the peace, having enabled the Republic to secure all the valuable possessions of France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, and to exclude Great Britain from the continent of Europe, when occasion may require, the British merchants and men of property, seeing the nation deprived of every possibility of making new conquests and of extending their commerce and manufactures, will not come forward with their money to enable the government to recommence a war, which can produce nothing but public danger.

3. That, should a ministry obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expences attendant on warlike preparations, would, in the course of the first two years, absorb a capital, the interest of which, would require ten millions sterling to be raised annually upon the public: a sum, that, added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country, or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

So that, although the ministry in parliament declared the resources of the nation to be still abundant to continue the war, it was perfectly evident that the danger which they apprehended from the pressure of the public

burdens, was the real cause that made them sue for peace.

It is rather unmannerly of Buonaparté, to say, that old England sued for peace! However, if it be true, as the world really believes it is, that the terms of the peace have broken down those bulwarks, which centuries of warfare, "heaps of treasure" and streams of British blood had "raised around the British empire," and that the soul and body of the empire itself, are thereby exposed to the uplifted daggers of a Jacobin Republic, we cannot, should we dislike the Consul's Philippics, with any sort of plausibility deny the fact.—At no period of the war was the situation of France so critical, as just when the preliminaries of London were signed. To have lost the battle of Marengo, might have lost the progress of the campaign, but the consequence would have been nothing more. At the juncture we refer to, the existence of the Republic, the destiny of France, hung upon the will of an irritated and all powerful enemy. The British navy was completely mistress of the Ocean, of the Gulph of Mexico, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Indian seas; from the Point of Florida to Cape Horn, and from Madagascar to Japan, every island, port and place, were under our command, and at our disposal; as were also the continent of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Natolia, Cyprus, Candia, the Morea and Grecian islands, Malta, Sicily, and Lisbon. No nation ever stood in such a posture. And sue for peace! A frank declaration to the world, and a liberal proposition to the court of Petersburg and to the United States, would have instantaneously rallied all the sovereigns of Europe and America (the king of Spain not excepted) around the British standard. Then we might have consolidated our maritime em-