The final section sketches out the basic elements of a reassurance-based cooperative security regime for space to illustrate how a fully developed system could address many of the most vexing challenges of space security in a way that looks very different from traditional arms control but that is much better suited to the special characteristics of space.

## Military and Environmental Dimensions of Space Security

Ever since the United States stopped leading international efforts to supplement the OST, other countries and non-governmental organizations have tried to fill the void. Proposals for multilateral PAROS-style negotiations date back to the mid-1980s after the Reagan administration rejected the kind of stand-alone ASAT ban that the Carter administration sought with the Soviet Union and instead made space the centerpiece of its Strategic Defense Initiative. The EU's draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities grows out of efforts that started in the mid-1990s to identify best practices and coordinating mechanisms that an increasing number of actors using space primarily for non-military purposes could follow to minimize inadvertent interference and environmental damage.<sup>7</sup> Much diplomatic and intellectual capital has been invested in these two approaches to space security, so it is understandable that their proponents might want to press forward with renewed vigor under changed political circumstances. There are good ideas in both approaches, but each speaks to the major security concerns of the originating countries without paying adequate attention to the security concerns of the other major space-faring nations. Moreover, each reflects a particular way of thinking about space security that made sense when the strategy was originally developed, but fails to capture the most important features of space security now and in the future.

The most fully developed idea that has been advanced in the context of PAROS discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the Russian- and Chinese-proposed draft "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Space Objects" (the PPW Treaty). The PPW Treaty has the hallmarks of classical arms control intended to enhance strategic stability<sup>8</sup> and, as the title makes clear, the accord would extend the OST's ban on orbiting weapons of mass destruction in space to a more general prohibition on deploying any type of weapon in space. The PPW Treaty would also transform the OST's vague protections for satellites into an explicit behavioral rule prohibiting the threat or use of force against space objects, defined to include any type of hostile action that interferes with a space object's normal functioning. The draft PPW Treaty encourages states to practice voluntary confidence-building measures, and suggests that any mandatory verification obligations could be addressed in an additional protocol.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities," Brussels, 3 December 2008, 16560/08, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Space Objects," draft of February 12, 2008, at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t408357.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In an earlier non-paper, the Chinese and Russian delegations argued the OST and many other treaties had enhanced security without including elaborate verification provisions. Therefore, states should concentrate on reaching consensus about new legally binding rules to prevent the weaponization of space, and consider later whether the added benefits of formal verification could be achieved in a way that was politically acceptable,