

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

destruction of chemical weapon stocks. Article IV of the "rolling text" and its annex contain a set of important provisions which seemed to have received general support. However, the introduction of document CD/757 by the French delegation may, however, cause considerable difficulties in the negotiations.

We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II. However, the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in document CD/757 lead us neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the ensuring of security.

What does the French document actually suggest? It provides that the States parties to the convention will have the right to retain production capacities and manufacture chemical weapons, and also acquire such weapons, for at least eight years and possibly longer after the convention enters into force. Moreover, this right would be granted not only to States possessing chemical weapons but also to those without them. As a result, the States possessing chemical weapons could renew their stocks (within the limits of the "security stock"), while those without could establish such "security stocks". This constitutes, in essence, a call for the legalized build-up and proliferation of chemical weapons. This suggestion leads not to equal security, but to increasing equal insecurity.

The security of the parties to the convention could, in our view, be ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a number of measures which would safely freeze stocks at current levels until they are destroyed, and would rule out preparations for their use as well as, naturally, their actual use. This would involve, first and foremost, the declaration of all the existing stocks, their placing under systematic international control with the help of on-site inspections and continuous monitoring with instruments, and the adoption of measures to ensure that the chemical weapons are not removed from the store except to a destruction facility. The relevant provision contained in paragraph 2 of article IV of the "rolling text" has been agreed upon by all delegations, and only one delegation has reserved its position. Moreover, the removal of chemical weapons from the store to a destruction facility should be conducted under international control. This provision, contained in the annex to article IV, section V, paragraph 6 (b), has been agreed upon by all participants in the negotiations.

The implementation of the above measures, which would in essence place chemical weapon stocks under "international arrest", would put all parties in an equal position in terms of their security.

The authors of document CD/757 consider that the security of all States parties may be called into question either gradually (e.g. as a result of delays in the timetable for the destruction of the stockpiles as a result of material difficulties) or suddenly (e.g. the exit from the convention of one of the States parties or its refusal to continue with the elimination of the remaining stocks). We agree that theoretically such situations may arise.