

As these examples demonstrate, the concept of pre-notification for out-of-garrison activities is not without precedent in past conventional arms control proposals. Moreover, this stabilizing measure greatly eases the task of monitoring treaty compliance. Post-reduction forces remain, as a matter of course, within designated garrisons. All out-of-garrison activities, e.g., for training exercises and unit rotation into or out of the area of application, are reported in advance, including such information as timing, duration, location, participating units, etc. The presence of unauthorized military formations, i.e., those for which no notification has been given, outside the garrison areas constitutes a violation of the treaty.

### **The Objective**

The objective of the verification exercise is to detect a militarily significant, inadvertent treaty violation:

(1) *"Militarily significant" treaty violation* —

The unauthorized presence of a unit formation(s) — brigades, divisions, armies, etc. — outside the designated garrisons, that is, unit(s) engaged in out-of-garrison activities for which no advance notification has been given. The following examples presented in the "Analysis" assume the presence in the coverage area of only one such "target," consisting of one unit formation or, alternatively, several units operating together. However, the model can accommodate multiple targets involving many independently operating units.

(2) *"Inadvertent" treaty violation* —

In general, infractions of the treaty can be categorized as either intentional or inadvertent depending upon the violator's intent. In the former, the violator consciously attempts to circumvent the terms of the treaty, for example, to assist preparations for an offensive; assuming it is the intention to preserve strategic and tactical surprise, the violator will try to hide these activities from the scrutiny of the treaty monitoring systems. The latter, on the other hand, represents an unintended and, hence, unconcealed contravention of the treaty, for example, the unsanctioned actions of a "rogue" unit commander, or careless co-ordination of unit rotation through the area of application. This is the case to which the following model applies.

The verification regime, then, is designed to deter a militarily significant, inadvertent (i.e., observable) treaty violation, and, thus, strengthen routine compliance with the treaty. Why is this important? The detection of violations, even those lacking malicious intent, can disrupt the stability of the treaty environment, leading to recriminations and, in the extreme, abrogation of the treaty.