

Secretariat and, with this nucleus, the dirgen has the basis of an organization. There remains the complex and perhaps lengthy process of recruiting a full pers establishment. The Paris Conf on Vietnam failed to come to grips with the problem posed by the fact that the Agreement made no/no mention of a secretariat even though the need for one was obvious; it thus appears that the Parties to the Agreement expect that any pers seconded by dels to the Secretariat must fall within the pers ceilings established in the Agreement. In the absence of a secretariat all dels have been forced to improvise and make do with very ltd facilities and support resources. Cda occupied the chair of the ICCS for the first month and was obliged to act as the Secretariat for the Commission as a whole. Even though the chair has passed to the Hungdel, Cdn officers, because of their good relations with local officials, their facility in English and their superior organization, and at the request of the other dels, still bear the burden of providing various services to the ICCS as a whole.

3. Organization in the field (Art 4 of the Protocol).

The Commission's regional hqs teams were deployed on Feb5, six days after the 48hr deadline for their deployment established in the Protocol concerning the ICCS. This deployment took place at the initiative of the Candel. At our urging the Commission agreed, as a first step, to reconnoitre sites to ensure that reasonable security existed. On the basis of that reconnaissance we were prepared to deploy on Feb5 but were obliged by the Pol and Hungdels to wait until Feb5 for the sake of presenting a united front. The Commission decided on Feb20 to deploy its remaining teams, those to be stationed at the sub-regional level as well as the "arms control" teams. The deadline for the deployment of these teams was Feb27. Deployment in fact was delayed for several days after the decision to deploy was taken because the Pol and Hungdels did not/not have a full complement of pers. In addition, the Commission has ordered the deployment of four teams to observe troop withdrawals. Of the seven regional hqs, 26 sub-regional teams and 15 point of entry teams, all except one sub-regional team and 4 point of entry teams have been deployed, and most in fact were in place before the Feb27 deadline. Three of the five that have not/not yet been deployed are in PRG-controlled territory and two are in contested areas. On Mar14 Cda had 132 civilian and military pers in the field as against 115 for Hungary, 145 for Indonesia, and 150 for Poland.

4. Commission procedures (Art 16 of Protocol).

The ICCS distinguished itself at the outset by operating for several days with no/no agreed procedures at all. There was some grumbling . . . that the ICCS should have been given priority to such matters rather than concentrate (as the Commission did) on matters of substance such as deployment to the regional hqs. In this context the Cdn proposal to establish a Special Group on Operating Procedures (SGOP) was received with relief. . . . At the group's first mtg on Feb3, the Cdn suggestion that discussion take place on basis of the Cdn draft memorandum of understanding was accepted without demur since other dels did not/not seem to have any proposals of their own. SGOP has held some 20 mtgs that should culminate within a few days in the adoption by the ICCS of a set of