

question is difficult, as the results in the several Provinces of the Dominion were not identical. There were great differences between the regiments, some comparing very favourably with the best of the militia of England, others inferior, in the matter of training to the very worst. It would be of little avail to criticize sharply where the difficulties to be contended with are so great, and where those who have overcome them deserve much praise. The most noticeable point was the apparent ignorance, in some instances, of the existence of faults which would attract the attention of all who are conversant with military affairs; thereby forcing the conclusion that unless some pattern should exist to which the regiments might conform, officers and men would be unaware of their shortcomings; and gradually, but surely, the efficiency of the whole force would yearly deteriorate. The second question involves so many considerations that its solution cannot be given in any dogmatic form, but may receive an answer from the teachings of history, and from the example of other nations. To revert to first principles.—For what is a Military Force required? First, to defend the country against external foes; Secondly, to act as a last resource in maintaining the power of the law; Thirdly, but far in the background, to be a symbol of the state which pertains to all nations aspiring to rank as such among their peers.

Now the first and most important requisite of a military force depends so entirely on the position of the country to which it belongs in regard to its neighbors, that it is impossible to consider it abstractedly, and consequently the case as regards Canada must present itself *per se* in respect to the question at issue. This great and growing Dominion stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, bounded on its southern frontier by the United States, and extending northwards into the forests and deserts of the Arctic regions, comprises a population of not more than 4,000,000 of which by far the greater portion reside between the south eastern shores of Lake Huron and the Atlantic. Putting aside therefore the Province of British Columbia, which if war were to break out must rely for its defence on other help than could be furnished from Canada; and the newly settled Province of Manitoba, which, bordering on a country almost as thinly populated as itself, has at present more to fear from Indians, or the lawless hunters and traders of the west, than from a regular enemy, what may be called Canada proper and the Maritime Provinces remain to be dealt with. These present a frontier, contiguous to the United States of about one thousand (1,000) miles, whilst along the coast many harbours, for the most part closed during the winter months furnish shelter for shipping and points of defence in case of war. The only enemy that appears likely seriously to threaten Canada is her powerful and now friendly neighbors the United States of America. There, in contradistinction to the condition of Europe, the military force is reduced very low, the total number of regular troops being about 30,000, scattered for the most part on the Indian frontier; whilst since the great civil war, the Militia and Volunteers which constituted on either side the vast majority of the army have received but little training. In fact the aspect of affairs appears so peaceful that some may be tempted to question the necessity on the part of Canada of keeping up any military force, and to ask why the money so applied should not rather be employed in developing the resources of the country. No reply except a reference

to history can be given to those who broach such opinions. There, however, the lessons have been so often repeated that they may be considered as conclusive. Periods of peace have never continued for any length of time, and clear as the political horizon now is, there are still clouds no larger perhaps than a man's hand which may be seen by those who are not dazzled by its brilliancy. On the other hand, the smallness of the force at the disposal of the United States, permits her neighbour to dispense with all but a skeleton of an army, sufficient to be a nucleus of a larger force in the event of war, and adapted for the minor but still necessary purposes already indicated. What description of force is best suited for these requirements is the question at issue.

As long as a garrison of Imperial troops remained in Canada (for the present small force at Halifax is far too feeble even to man its forts, and therefore cannot be counted for the defence of the country generally) the Active Militia formed the second line, whilst the main body of enrolled men was available as a reserve. The regular troops furnished also a standard to which the militia were bound as far as possible to conform, and the several stations where they were quartered served as schools at which its officers and non-commissioned officers might acquire the rudiments of instruction and become imbued with a proper military spirit. With the departure of the Imperial troops these advantages have disappeared, and although it may truly be said that a great and growing nation such as Canada now is, will feel its responsibilities and act up to them, and will even by relying on its own strength increase in vigor when the artificial supports are withdrawn, yet the difficulties engendered by the absence of all professional soldiers must be faced, and the want they supplied be met, by some well digested plan. There is a feeling in the Dominion that the present militia system admirable in its conception, and good in many of its details yet scarcely fulfils the expectation entertained when it was first framed, and that the time has come for a modification of some of its features. To suggest any alternations without first stating the grounds for so doing, would be presumptuous, and it is only by appealing to the teaching of recent events on both sides of the Atlantic, that any opinions that may be urged would merit consideration.

The first instance that occurs is that of the United States when the great war of 1861 broke out, and when the nation divided into two hostile camps strove to put forth its whole strength either for aggression or defence. Previous to that event but a very small regular force had been maintained; but the several States had organized a system of militia, some States excelling others in military ardour and consequently in the number and efficiency of their troops. War commenced, large armies were organized, the small regular force furnished officers as far as it was able to do so; but on both sides during the first campaign, the troops were little better than armed mobs. The result was that the war was greatly prolonged, and much useless slaughter of men and expenditure of money were the result. It is almost certain that if either side had possessed but a small body of well disciplined troops to leaven the larger masses, the battle of Bull's Run would have resulted in the capture of Washington or Richmond, according to the weight thrown into the scale by the regular troops. It was only gradually that the billigerents fully recognized the fact that

the military profession meant more than the mere wearing of uniform. The regular officers were, at the commencement of the war, looked upon with jealousy and their opinions regarded as the results of professional pedantry. Gradually, however, public feeling on this point changed, and it is a remarkable fact that with scarcely an exception no officers acquired any wide renown on either side excepting those who had been educated in the United States regular army. This example is cited as showing that principles recognized in Europe have been proved by practice as applicable to the condition of society on this side of the Atlantic.

To take more recent instances, the teaching of the last wars in Europe appears to point to two great results. One is that modern armies will in future be of vast size and beyond the possibility of being maintained at full efficiency during times of peace, consequently the greater portion of the force will partake of the character of Militia. The second is, that those short service men, and when the reserves are called out, those soldiers who have returned to civil life, require highly educated officers and thorough trained non-commissioned officers to lead them in time of active service. This is the system approved of in the most highly organized of European armies, where the short service regular troops, and the landwehr are officered by men who have received considerable professional instruction.\*

Now, to advocate for Canada any plan approaching to that which prevails in Germany would be manifestly absurd; as, happily, the political condition of the two nations, in regard to the necessity for military preparation, is as different as it well can be: whilst an attempt to enforce compulsory service in Canada would, even if it were approved by the people through their representative, tend to injure the prosperity of the country by the check it would cause to emigration. The instance is merely quoted to show the opinion held in the most military nation in Europe of the necessity of training for those who aspire to lead troops, whether as officers or in the lower grades.

The inference to be drawn from the instances quoted would appear to be—That a small force, well trained, and officered by men who have learned their profession, has become a necessity for Canada; this force being intended to serve as a training school, and as a standard of comparison for the real army of the country—i.e., the Active and the Reserve Militia. An argument may be raised against this scheme, on the ground that the Imperial forces, although removed from the country, would, in the event of war, supply skilled officers to train the militia; and that consequently the expense which the small force here proposed would necessitate, might be an unnecessary burden on the resources of the country. To this it may be replied,—That a war that would involve Canada in serious hostilities, would be also one which would tax to their utmost the resources of Great Britain, both in officers and men. Her own reserve forces would require a supply of trained officers, and it would be difficult to provide sufficient young and energetic officers and non-commissioned officers for her increased needs. The most that Canada could expect, irrespective of any troops that might be sent to her aid, would be a staff; and, as a matter of course, a supply of the material of war.

\*NOTE.—In a recent report on the Swiss Militia, where its many shortcomings are pointed out, it is recognized as a fact by all who advocate reform, that a civic force requires a thoroughly trained staff to guide it, more, rather than less, than a professional army.

(To be continued.)