The Legal News.

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The case of *In re De Souza* has attracted some attention in Ontario. Mr. De Souza, who is an English barrister, claimed the right to practice before the Courts of Ontario without the intervention of the Law Society. The case came before the Common Pleas Division, which held that an English barrister, as such, is not entitled to practice in the Courts of Ontario unless admitted through the Law Society of the Province.

A telegram in the *N. Y. Herald* mentions a case before the English courts which will be of some interest. A jury had found a cabman guilty of receiving a half-sovereign at night, supposing it to be a shilling, but afterwards, when its real value was known, he retained it. The passenger carried also supposed it to be a shilling. At the trial the Court reserved the point of larceny. There being a difference of opinion between the judges as to whether the act constituted larceny, the question was ordered to be argued before the full bench.

Judge Bleckley, of the Georgia Bar Association, in a report on the subject of judicial reform, complains of the lagging administration of the law. "How is it," he asks, "with practical remedial jurisprudence? Is it up with, or is it behind the age? Compare it with other business, public or private; with operations of the war department, the navy, the treasury, the post-office, the interior; with commerce, manufactures, banking, transportation, mining, farming; with the venerable and conservative vocations of teaching and preaching; with any thing, and what is its relative position? The main bulk of world-work is ahead of it; several branches of that work, for instance, the postal service, general transportation, commerce and manufactures, are so far in advance that the law seems to crawl whilst they go on wings. Is this relative backwardness a necessary condition, rooted in the nature of things, or is it attributable to deficient energy and enterprise on the part of the legal profession? Can it be possible the law is to become obsolete; that the ages are to outgrow it; and that though sufficing for the past, it is not equal to the demands of the future? Will it be Bradstreeted as a failure? Surely this supposition cannot be entertained. And if not, the conclusion is imminent that either directly or indirectly, we lawyers are responsible for the wide chasm that separates the effective administration of the law from those industries, public and private, with which it ought to be abreast. Is it fit that a body of men so numerous, so cultivated, so capable, should suffer their quota of labour, their distinctive calling, to remain hopelessly behind? Let a noble, manly pride answer in the negative." Mr. Bleckley's suggestions, however, like those of a good many other reformers, do not contain much that impresses itself as a real improvement.

THE LAW OF LIBEL.

In charging the jury in the case of *Reg.* v. *Tassé* (*ante*, p. 98), Mr. Justice Ramsay observed:—

Gentlemen of the Jury,—This case is one of some difficulty. At all times cases of libel were surrounded with difficulty. In ordinary criminal cases we deal with the theft of a man's watch or his purse, but in libel the question is as to a man's reputation, and this investigation demands more attention and care. I shall therefore endeavor to make the object of your enquiry as clear as possible, and in so doing I shall at once refer to something that was told you at the opening of the trial. The learned gentleman, who is complainant in this case, said that your verdict would have the effect of justifying his conduct or of condemning him; that the object of the trial was to obtain this justification or condemnation. This is not absolutely correct. It is perfectly true that a verdict of "not guilty" would be a declaration on your part that all that had been said was strictly true, and that the publication was for the benefit of the public; but a verdict of "guilty" would not necessarily be a justification. I don't say this to influence